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Abstract:

!

The European Union (EU) is frequently credited for the peace and stability in Western
Europe since World War II. The Union’s creation of the common market and its efforts to
promote liberal ideals of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights are among
the many reasons cited. After the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the expansion of the EU through Eastern Enlargement became a prominent topic
both within the EU and within the former Soviet states. Resolving conflicts in the region
is vital to the stability of the region, and will create more secure borders for EU member
states, making conflict resolution a concern of the EU. In this thesis, I assess how
effective European Union efforts to help Moldova and Transnistria reach a peaceful
settlement have been. Specifically I look at the ENP Action Plan along with the EU
progress reports on the Action Plan, cooperation efforts among the EU, The Organization
for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union Border
Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM) to arrive at conclusions, in the final chapter,
about conflict resolution. I analyze this conflict and the importance of its resolution in the
current context of the instability in neighboring Ukraine due to the secessionist
movement of Crimea and the Russian support of it.

!
!
!iv

v

!

!
!
!
!
!
Chapter One: Introduction

!
Soviet Collapse and the Potential for Liberalization in Eastern Europe
!

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet

Union. This symbol of the divide between Communism of the East and Democracy of the
West had served as a constant reminder to the world of the Soviet Union’s power and
influence over Eastern Europe for more than forty years. In President Ronald Reagan’s
famous speech at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987, the symbolism of the wall was put into
powerful words:
We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go
together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace.
There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance
dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek
peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, if you seek
liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear
down this wall.1

!

By 1991, the Soviet Union was no more. Its former member states began

declaring independence and the world had one less superpower. This was followed by
periods throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium of instability all over the
region, which was problematic for Europe. After nearly seven decades of Soviet rule, the
newfound independence of these former Soviet states presented many challenges,
including the establishment of functioning democracies and market economies where
1

National Archives. Document for June 12th: Remarks at Branderburg Gate, Berlin, Germany, 06/12/1987.
http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/?dod-date=612. Date Accessed October 20, 2014

state control had previously existed.2 The early 1990s also saw a new incarnation of the
European Community (EC), renamed the European Union (EU) in 1993, which
represented prosperity, stability, and security to many of these states in transition.
Demonstration of European ambitions by these newly independent states began to
emerge, which presented an opportunity for Europe to begin exporting democratic ideals
in effort to facilitate some stability and prosperity in the region.
This was not a one-sided effort. Many former authoritarian regimes aspire to
democracy, because states with functioning democracies “rank among the world’s most
stable, affluent, and cohesive countries.”3 Despite this norm, those in power in
authoritarian regimes, and the members of the elite classes immediately following an
authoritarian regime collapse, tend to resist the ideas of democracy, because it threatens
their position of privilege.4 There remains, even today, a strong resistance to the Western
support of liberalization of the region by minority groups still sympathetic to Russia and
the ideals of the former Soviet Union.
The European Union has made concerted efforts to promote and to maintain peace
in the greater European space, including in the post-Soviet space. Since the creation of
the European Coal and Steel Community, the predecessor of today’s European Union,
Europe has seen “the longest period of peace and an unparalleled level of prosperity to its

2

Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger, Christopher S. Allen, Joan DeBardeleben, Stephen Hellman, David Ost,
George Ross. European Politics in Transition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2009), pp. 3-4.
3 Ibid. p. 13.
4 Ibid. pp. 13-15.
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peoples….promoting economic growth and solidarity and supporting democratic forces
in countries emerging from dictatorship.”5
Democracy Replaces Authoritarian Regimes in Eastern Europe

!

The opportunity for potential Eastern enlargement of the EU provided conditions

for the EU to influence these new states in Eastern Europe. Would the desire on the part
of these formerly communist states to transform into democracies lead to peace, stability,
security, and prosperity in the region? The European Union hoped so and began offering
assistance to several of these states. Today, nine of the twenty-eight members of the
European Union are from the Eastern Bloc or from the former Soviet Union. They have
successfully met the rigorous benchmarks required for admission and have taken years to
do so. Can these states represent the potential for the rest of the former Soviet space? Is
this a positive result for the Eastern enlargement experiment? Is it even possible to
answer this question? Even among scholars whom agree that democratic states
experience greater levels of peace, stability, and prosperity, there is no consensus as to
why this phenomenon occurs.6
When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many
authoritarian regimes were replaced “with democratic values and institutions in much of
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.”7 In Europe, many of these newly independent
states began expressing European ambitions and looked toward the European Community
5

The European Union Explained: Extending European values and standards to more countries:
Enlargement. The European Commission. http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/enlargement_en.pdf. Date
Accessed: November 13, 2014.
6 Bruce Russett, et. at. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 25.
7 Ibid.
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(soon to be renamed the European Union) for support. Perhaps the cooperation with an
international organization, which helps facilitate friendly relations between democratic
states by creating an interdependency and the mutually beneficial condition of
cooperation would encourage peace and stability in the region. This is the fundamental
reason for yet another hypothesis as to why democracies may not attack each other: “The
states in question are peaceful toward each other because they are bound by common ties
in a network of institutions crossing national boundaries.”8 This would especially support
the theory that [now named] European Union membership would benefit those states
working on democratic state-building initiatives in order to stabilize both the political and
economic systems which are in a very fragile infantile state, especially in this volatile
region. “…certainly one of the major motivations of the founders of the institutions that
evolved into the EC [and now the EU] was to bind together previously hostile states so
that they would be unable to make war on each other.”9 Through the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade area made accessible through the European Union, new
opportunities will be available to Moldova.
This would be especially important in Eastern Europe, where separatist conflicts
would begin to arise almost immediately. In the case of the Republic of Moldova,10 which
I will discuss in this thesis, this minority resistance to Europeanization has led to
separatist conflicts, and the European Union has assisted in the attempted resolution or
stabilization of these conflicts in efforts to continue the liberalization, and thereby

8

Ibid.
Ibid. p. 26.
10 Thereafter, the Republic of Moldova will be referred to as Moldova.
9
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stabilization, of the post-Soviet space. In the year following Moldova’s declaration of
independence, a violent separatist conflict arose on the banks of the Dneister/Nistru
River.11 The region known as Transnistria, a tiny strip of land situated in between the
Dneistr/Nistru River and the Ukrainian border,12 declared its independence from Moldova
in 1992, and war broke out. The territories of Moldova did not always include what has
become the de facto state of Transnistria, and has changed hands on multiple occasions
over time. Moldova has gone from being part of Romanian-controlled Bessarabia, to
Russian-controlled Moldavia, to an independent state including the formerly Russian
territory of Transnistria.13 Transnistria has never been part of greater Romania, and has
never developed any identity outside of a Russian one. All of this shifting of control has
created a division of identities within the borders between those who consider themselves
to be Romanian and Moldovan and those who identify as Russians.
These ethnic and political divides fueled by post-Soviet nostalgia from the
separatists and European ambitions on the part of the parent state have caused instability
in the region, which is unsettling for the countries of the European Union. Following the
recent events in Crimea and Ukraine, the European Union has made a move which

11

Dov Lynch. Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflict and De Facto States.
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 2004), p. 33.
12 Matthew Crandall, “Hierarchy in Moldova-Russian Relations: The Transnistrian Effect,” Studies of
Transition States and Societies, 4:1, (2012) p. 5.
13 Charles King, The Moldovans, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1999), pp. 36-62.
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Moldova has been waiting approximately two decades14 for: the signing of an Association
Agreement. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all taken the first official step towards
membership into the European Union with the signing of Association Agreements, which
outline the most important steps for each country to take toward meeting the standards for
admission.15 These parameters include many of the basic tenets of democracy, and will
encourage the implementation of democratic values and institutions, which are expected
to increase stability; an objective that the EU has been working towards in various ways
for nearly fifteen years.
In 2001, the EU drafted and adopted the European Union Programme for the
Prevention of Violent Conflicts,16 illustrating the level of importance the EU places on
the elimination of conflicts and violence in the post-Soviet (and global) space. In it, the
following declaration:
The international community has a political and moral responsibility to act to
avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by violent conflicts.
The European Union is a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic
values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and

14

In 1994, Moldova signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which was the first
move in establishing a relationship built on cooperation “which would strengthen and widen the relations
established in the past…considering the commitment of the Parties to promote international peace and
security as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes and to cooperate to this end in the framework of the
United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe…Recognizing the efforts of the
Republic of Moldova to create political and economic systems, which respect the rule of law and human
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and that the Republic of Moldova operates a
multiparty system with free and democratic elections, and provides for economic liberalization,”
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova.
15 EU forges closer ties with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. European Union External Action. http://
eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/270614_association_agreement_en.htm Date Accessed: 11.11.14.
16 The European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. The Council of the European
Union forwarding note from the Secretariat to the Delegations. June 7, 2001. 9357/1/01 REV 1. http://
register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209537%202001%20REV%201 Date Accessed:
November 11, 2014.
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sustainable development. The process of enlargement will extend this community of
peace and progress to a wider circle of European states.17

!

The Programme goes on to encourage a continuation of tandem work with other
organizations whose aim is to further peace and security in the region, including the
United Nations, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), further demonstrating a long-term and widespread commitment to continued
peace, especially in the volatile post-Soviet space.
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

!

The emergence of fifteen new independent states, which had formerly been

members of the Soviet Union, presented a new situation for Europe and the European
Union to consider: instability and uncertainty on her borders. Would these new states be
able to sustain and were they capable of implementing the necessary foundations and
institutions to build stable, functioning democracies after decades of state control under
communist rule? These questions would not be left to fate. The EU began considering
Eastern enlargement, though the first round of member states from the Eastern Bloc and
former Soviet Union would not occur until 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.18 These eight states now serve as
inspiration for Eastern states with European ambitions and also as barometers to
determine the degree of success that may come out of Eastern enlargement.
The EU felt that extending membership to these countries would assist in the
acceleration of the adoption of democratic norms and of a free market by providing

17
18

Ibid.
The European Union Explained.
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support and access to more prosperous Western Europe. “Enlargement serves the interests
of Member States as well as acceding countries. It makes Europe a safer and more
prosperous place, in particular through its promotion of democracy and fundamental
freedoms, the rule of law, and the single market.”19 Since the inception of the European
Union - via its precursory incarnations: the European Coal and Steel Community, the
European Economic Community, and the European Community20 - the goal has been
security, peace and economic prosperity through interconnectedness and a common
market. This strategy has proven successful in the post-communist and post-Soviet space;
the countries from this region that have joined the EU have had tremendous successes,
and “have outperformed all the others, and not just because of access to Europe’s
markets. Even more important was the institutional infrastructure, including the biding
commitment to democracy and the vast array of laws and regulations.”21
Eastern Enlargement was not without huge obstacles and much apprehension. Not
only were these fledgling countries unstable, they were also poor. State control had
resulted in nonexistent markets, massive levels of debt, and systems of infrastructure that
were “at least half a century behind [that of Western Europe]. The income level of the
region, on average, reached only 32 percent of the European Union’s average in 1995.”22
Not only would it be impossible for these countries to contribute to the budget of the EU,

19

Ibid.
Neill Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Union. (Durham: Duke University Press,
2006), p. 6-35.
21 Ivan T. Berend. From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union: The Economic and Social Transformation
of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 100-101.
22 Ibid.
20
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which was one of the requirements for membership, they would require large amounts of
support and assistance from the Union and her existing member states.
Moldova has a long and complex political history, and I will not be able to fully
discuss it in this thesis. However, it is important to note that Moldova, for about a decade
following independence, was the only former Soviet state with a democratically elected
Communist-majority government. The tide changed in 2009, when the Communist party
narrowly lost their majority, dropping to 48% of the representation in parliament, and a
new, pro-European coalition began forming between the Democrats, the Liberals, and the
Liberal Democrats. This coalition lasted through March 2013, when charges of corruption
of the Prime Minister Vladmir Filat caused the coalition to break down, and recent
elections have seen major gains by the Communist party again. This could be a result of
the climate in neighboring Ukraine and Crimea, but it did not stop the Moldovan
government from signing an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014.
However, despite the Communist majority in parliament at the time, moves by
Moldova made in the early to mid-1990s demonstrated the desire to turn west; Moldova
“signed various basic documents with NATO and the EU in the mid-1990s. Moldova
signed NATO’s Partnership for Peace Framework Document in March 1994…[and a]
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU was completed in November
1994…”23 Moldova was also admitted to the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1995, the
Council praising “its handling of inter-ethnic affairs, in particular the way it dealt with the

23

John Lowenhardt, Ronald J. Hill and Margot Light. “A Wider Europe: The View from Minsk and
Chisinau,” International Affairs, 77:3. (July, 2001). p. 607.
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demands of autonomy of the Gagauz population,”24 a one-time secessionist movement in
the south. This secessionist movement started at about the same time as the Transnistira
one, leaving Moldova to deal with two secessionist movements at the same time, which
will be discussed in Chapter Two.
The new phenomenon of “globalization” was upon us at this time, and the region
of Eastern Europe represented a lot of potential risk. However, the European Union was
the world’s largest single market, and a more integrated Europe represented a huge
potential reward: “100 million new, hungry consumers, a rapidly growing market with
much greater possibility for exports and strengthening the economy of scale and
competitiveness.”25 This would not just be in the interest of the EU, however. The Eastern
European countries vying for potential membership would benefit as well, as this
economic investment would help them begin meeting the benchmarks which would
eventually be required of them according to the European Commission:
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union…The associate countries
in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European
Union…as soon as an associate country is able to assure the obligations of membership
by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.

!

Support from the European Union would help with the implementation of market

economies, as well as democratic institutions, without which a market economy would
likely fail. Putting such extremely different structures and institutions into place would

24
25

Ibid.
Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union, p. 85.
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take time and planning. The steps needed to be made clear and needed to be
demonstrable. The European Union came up with a path to accession which would create
a new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) with nations that needed guidance and
support. The goal of these ENPs was an eventual translation into ENP Action Plans,
which would lead to Association Agreements, which would then lead to candidacy. The
Eastern Partnership, launched in 2009, is another means of support and guidance for
states that desire membership into the EU, and “is a joint initiative between the EU, EU
countries and the eastern European partner countries. It enables partner countries
interested in moving towards the EU and increasing political, economic, and cultural
links to do so.”26
The New Neighborhood and its Terms

!

The parameters of the ENP, its Action Plans, and the Association Agreements are

all designed to move the countries they are associated with further toward candidacy for
EU membership by demonstrating a fundamental commitment to the democratic values
of the European Union and its member states. They “build on common interests and on
values - democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion.”27
While the ENP agreements can help put countries on a track to meeting some of
the requirements which will eventually matter for EU membership, there is not an
outright promise from the EU for membership consideration. This can present a number
of problems alongside the benefits, which are “predominantly long term and the road map
26

Eastern Partnership. EEAS (European External Action Service). European Union. http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm Date Accessed: November 14, 2014.
27 European Neighborhood Policy. EEAS (European External Action Service). European Union. http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm Date Accessed: November 14, 2014.
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toward them is rather vague.”28 There is also little real power held by the EU in
influencing the state participating in the ENP, because the rewards are not immediately
accessible. Also, EU funds are limited for the Eastern region, so financial incentives
which would be extremely attractive in the region are little to none.29 The vagueness of
these agreements, coupled with the lack of financial support and incentives make it
difficult for nations which are still finding their bearings in the world of democracy and
the free-market, and, most importantly, trying to stabilize or resolve what had been
violent separatist conflicts. More specificity would be needed to produce real, tangible
results.
Purpose of this Thesis

!

On February 22, 2005, Moldova signed an ENP Action Plan, which attempted to

lay out the steps that would be necessary for further European integration, to be taken
over the next three years.30 Many critics felt the Plan was not specific enough,31 and did
not provide a feasible and demonstrable framework for Moldova to progress toward
meeting the ultimate benchmarks required for eventual membership consideration. The
plan called for actions to be taken which would move Moldova in the direction of

28

Nicu Popescu. “Europeanization and conflict resolution: a view from Moldova,” Journal on
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 5:1. (2004) p. 6.
29 Ibid.
30 EU-Moldova Action Plan. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf
Date Accessed: September 29, 2014.
31 For further reading:
Karen E. Smith. “The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy,” International Affairs, 81:4, (July
2005) pp. 757-773.
Elena A. Korosteleva. “Change or Continuity: Is the Eastern Partnership an Adequate Tool for the European
Neighborhood?” International Relations, 25:2, (2011) pp. 243-262.
Nicu Popescu. “The EU in Moldova: Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood,” Journal of Foreign Policy
of Moldova, 12, (2005) pp. 3-44.
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liberalization, further integrating into the economic and social structures of Europe by
putting into place the fundamentals of democracy, including judiciary reforms, improving
the degree of the rule of law in the state, strengthening the economy in an effort to not
only make it function independently as a free market, but to also be able to contribute and
compete in the EU’s Internal Market.32 There is also clear demonstration within the
Action Plan of the importance of resolution of the Transnistria conflict.
This thesis will examine the efforts made on the part of the European Union by
way of the ENP Action Plan and the progress made to date, as well as the recent
Association Agreements signed in 2014 following the unrest in Crimea and Ukraine. I
will examine the original Action Plans and the subsequent annual progress reports
published by the Commission of the European Communities, evaluating the progress
made. I will discuss the cooperation between the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union Border Assistance
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), as both organizations work in tandem with
the EU in roles outlined in the ENP Action Plans to help secure and stabilize the region
and reach a resolution to the conflict. I will also analyze the progress reports published by
each of these agencies regarding their participation and progress in Moldova. My
evaluation of the efficacy of these efforts will be discussed in the fourth chapter. The fifth
chapter will, in conclusion, consider the Association Agreements signed in the wake of
the Crimean crisis, and what this may mean for Moldova and Transnistria going forward.

32

EU-Moldova Action Plan.
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The post-Soviet space is a prime candidate for research and analysis, and much
work exists which discusses the Transnistria conflict as well as the European Union’s
involvement in the region, including in Moldova. Immediately following the agreement
between Moldova and the EU on the ENP and its Action Plan, there was a proliferation of
research on the topics of both Transnistria and Moldova. Much of the literature which
examines the ENPs discuss them as a whole, taking into consideration each aspect of the
plans, each of which play a significant role in Moldova’s progress. The existing research
on Transnistria often tends to discuss overall EU involvement in a resolution, and why
the EU may have a stake in the post-Soviet space as each enlargement since 2004 has
moved EU borders towards it. There is especially significant discussion regarding
Russia’s involvement in Transnistria, the economic subsidies and support provided by
Russia which hinder Moldova’s economic progression, and the presence of Russian
forces in the region despite fervent objection from the Moldovan government. Human
rights issues, the trafficking of humans, weapons, and contraband, and the need for a
more secure border is also frequently discussed.
For the purpose of this thesis, I will rely somewhat on scholarly sources which
discuss the above issues, mostly in a historical context. However, the majority of my
work will focus significantly on primary sources: the original ENP Action Plan published
by the European Union, the annual progress reports mandated by the Action Plan
evaluating Moldova’s progress regarding the resolution of the Transnistria conflict,
annual reports published by the OSCE (who work in tandem with the EU on the
stabilization and resolution of the conflict), and annual reports published by EUBAM.
!14

The Action Plans present Moldova with objectives the EU would like to see progress on
over the three years following the signing. Each annual ENP Action Plan progress report
documents Moldova’s efforts to further engage in political dialogue with the EU, as well
as continued talks with Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria), and with the other important
actors: the OSCE, Ukraine and Russia. These talks are known as the “5 + 2 negotiations,”
and include the EU and the United States as observers. My thesis will focus on EU,
OSCE, and EUBAM efforts in settling the Transnistria conflict, and any discussion of
these or other factors will only occur when applicable to discussion of the conflict.
Methodology and Structure

!

Moldova will not be able to resolve the conflict in Transnistria unilaterally, this

much is certain. Europe does not want instability on her borders and has clearly
demonstrated a willingness to enlarge into the post-Soviet space as a way of liberalizing
and stabilizing the region. The creation of the ENP and EUBAM, and the cooperation
with the OSCE show a concerted effort to assist Moldova in building a more prosperous,
stable, democratic state akin to her neighbors who have succeeded in this goal. It is my
hypothesis that the Transnistria conflict is the biggest obstacle to EU membership
candidacy for Moldova and must be resolved in order for Moldova to advance to
candidacy. The ENP was the first official step taken by the EU to assist Moldova in
reaching its ambitious membership benchmarks; reaching a resolution to the Transnistria
conflict was listed in the ENP Action Plan as having the highest priority.
This thesis is my attempt to evaluate the efficacy of the EU’s efforts in Moldova
through the ENP in making progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Transnistria
!15

conflict. It is also an evaluation of the efforts of the OSCE and EUBAM to help resolve
the Transnistria conflict and thereby improve Moldova’s chances for entry into the EU. I
will first discuss the priorities for action in Moldova regarding the Transnistria conflict as
identified in the ENP Action Plans. I will then discuss the implementation of these
priorities and the positive or negative degree of success Moldova experienced year-overyear as determined by the EU and articulated via its published annual progress reports
from 2006 to 2013. My conclusions about progress toward resolving the Transnistria
conflict will be drawn from my analysis of these documents. I will also speculate on how
the current political climate in neighboring Ukraine and Crimea have perhaps influenced
the recent decision to enter into an Association Agreement with Moldova as a next step to
EU membership capacity.
I will begin in Chapter Two by discussing the history of the MoldovanTransnistrian conflict from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following declaration
of Moldovan independence. I will bring the reader up-to-date on the conflict and will
discuss the involvement of Russia in Transnistria in order to fully illustrate the divide
between the population regarding Europeanization or Russification. Chapter Three will
explain the involvement of the EU via the ENP Action Plans, the creation of EUBAM
and its goals, and the cooperation of the OSCE to encourage a resolution of the conflict.
It will discuss specific goals of the ENP Action Plans regarding the Transnistria conflict
and the documentation of progress, or lack thereof, published in the annual ENP progress
reports, EUBAM progress reports, and OSCE progress reports. Chapter Four will consist
of my analysis of the efficacy of the efforts to date which have lead to the signing of
!16

Association Agreements in 2014. In Chapter Five, I draw conclusions about the efficacy
of EU efforts to create stability and to promote democratic ideals in Moldova. This
discussion will take into consideration the current conflict between Ukraine and Crimea
and how that conflict contributed to the extension of an Association Agreement for
Moldova, which is often considered the next step to EU membership.
At the end of the sections pertaining to the evaluation of each entity I have
included a progress chart. These charts attempt to demonstrate degrees of progress as
articulated within each entities’ own progress report. I have relied on the descriptions of
progress given in the report, and, in instances where progress is not described explicitly, I
have determined the level of progress based on previous reports’ description and the
wording of the report in question. For example, in cases where progress is considered
“Good” within the text of the report, I will consider the progress “Good.” In cases where
there is just a notation of continued participation or efforts, I have considered this “Good”
as well. If, in the previous year’s report, progress was listed as “Limited” or “Some” I
will likewise consider the subsequent progress status quo unless otherwise stated if not
explicitly noted by the entity publishing the report. This is clearly not a scientific
measurement, given the lack of definition by each entity of what constitutes each degree
of progress, and is meant only to represent broadly noted degrees of progress.
Limitations, Exclusions and Thesis Significance

!

There are many factors contributing to the slow progress toward EU membership

made by Moldova, and they are all worthy of in-depth analysis. Issues including
strengthening democratic institutions, the judiciary, rule of law, civil society, the freedom
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of the press, environmental factors, trade agreements, human rights issues, and economic
development are no less important that the Transnistria issue. For the purpose of this
thesis, which attempts to analyze the efficacy of efforts toward conflict resolution, many
of these issues will only be discussed briefly when relevant to the conflicts.
While there has been extensive scholarly research analyzing the Transnistria
conflict, much of it has come prior to the current climate of an active conflict in
neighboring Ukraine. This conflict between Crimea and Ukraine is supported by Russia
and is not unlike that of the conflict in Transnistria. My research has been conducted as
the events in Ukraine have unfolded, and has taken a much different tone given these
events. Many consider the conflict in Transnistria to be a “frozen” one, and, as of today, it
is. A successful secession of Crimea may influence leaders in Tiraspol to move forward
with demands for independence, and it is important to understand the conflict in current
terms. An analysis of the work done to date in the region by the EU, EUBAM, and the
OSCE while considering the Ukrainian situation will provide an important shift toward
urgency in the conversation.

!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter Two: Moldova and the Transnistria Conflict

!
Background on Moldova and Transnistria
!

The territory of Moldova has been somewhat malleable for centuries. Prior to the

borders of today’s Republic of Moldova, the area was part of Romanian Bessarabia until
the early 1800s, when the Russian Empire took control. In 1918 following the Russian
Revolution, Moldova again became a Romanian province. In 1940, Moldova flipped back
over to Russian control, this time including a tiny strip of land known as Transnistria, and
became part of the Soviet Union as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova.33 It is
important to note that Transnistria was incorporated into territorial Moldova directly prior
to Moldova’s integration into the Soviet Union, and was never part of greater Romania or
under Romanian control. For almost half a century, Moldova would remain a Soviet state
until declaring its independence in 1991. Transnistria and Gagauzia followed suit,
declaring independence from Moldova shortly thereafter and creating two simultaneous
secessionist movements. While autonomy would be granted to Gagauzia in 1994 through
the Autonomy Statute for Gagauzia in the Moldovan constitution,34 a bloody and violent
war broke out in Transnistria shortly after its declaration of independence from Moldova.

33 Andrew

Williams. “Conflict Resolution after the Cold War: The Case of Moldova,” Review of
International Studies, 25:1. (1999) pp. 73-74.
34 Claus Neukirch.. "Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: The Case of the Gagauz Territorial Autonomy
in the Republic of Moldova." Minority Governance in Europe, series on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues
1 (2002). p. 105.
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The conflict between many former Soviet states, the Caucasus, and the Baltic
states, and the breakaway de facto states seeking independence is typically an ethnic one,
as in the case of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, and Nagorno Karabak, and was the
case in Kosovo, a successful secessionist movement in Serbia. The Transnistria conflict,
though it can seem ethnically motivated when one considers the level of internal proRussian support and the degree of economic support provided to Transnistria by Russia,
tends to be more political, driven by Soviet nostalgia and Russian support. Following
Moldova’s integration into the Soviet Union, the recently incorporated territory of
Transnistria played an important role as the center of Moldova’s industry, as the majority
of the state was highly agrarian.35 When Moldova became part of the Soviet Union,
Russia supported the industrialization of the Transnistria region36, and the demographics
of the region began shifting. People became more mobile in search of work, and the area
of Transnistria offered many opportunities due to the level of industry concentrated there.
Russians and Ukrainians began moving into Transnistria, and by 1989, the population
was more than a quarter Russian.37 The Moldovans tended to remain in the rural areas
and made up only about twenty-five percent of the urban population.38
Transnistria also had a heavy Russian military presence, starting with the Soviet
46th Army, which eventually became the Russian 14th Army, an elite division of the
Soviet military, which “became central to the economic and social life of Transnistria.”39
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Political tendencies favored the Soviets, who were providing security and economic
stability to Transnistria and her citizens. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
there would be little to no feelings of support for the forthcoming Moldovan nationalist
movement toward independence. Soviet support and opposition to the nationalists in
Transnistria, coupled with the ethnically-motivated secessionist movement in Gagauzia,
would result in two simultaneous independence movements within an independence
movement.
Moldovan Nationalism Movement and the Politics of Language

!
!

Language has played a major role in the Moldovan nationalist movement. In

1989, at the beginning of the move toward independence, the declaration of Romanian40
as the official state language of Moldova and the return to the usage of Latin script
represented a major shift from the culture of the Soviet days to the new turn Westward.41
This was a move similar to one made by the Soviet Union in the 1940s when Moldova
became part of the USSR: signs, schools, government, all began operating in Russian, so
Romanian [Moldovan] speaking Moldovans were forced to learn Russian. Now, as
Moldova struggled to distance itself from the Soviets, the national language became
Romanian, forcing Russian speakers to go through the same process Moldovans had been
pushed through decades earlier.42 The Latin alphabet began replacing, or at the very least,
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appearing side-by-side with the Cyrillic alphabet, not only due to the functionality of the
new national language of Romanian, but also as a symbolic demonstration against the
imperialist domination of Russia.43 “Making Romanian the state language and changing
from the Cyrillic to the Latin script were key issues of the nationalist movement in 1988
and 1989. The question of alphabet was especially symbolic and was used by nationalists
to provide an example of Russian cultural dominance.”44
In early 1989, several laws were drafted to address the issue of language. “On the
Status of the State Language of the MSSR,” “On the Transition of the Moldovan
Language to the Latin Script,” and “On the Functioning of the Languages Spoken on the
Territory of the MSSR” were published, resulting in over 250,000 letters being sent to the
daily newspaper, Moldova Socialista, in support of the new legislation and the return to
Romanian [Moldovan] as the state language.45
This process of switching over from Russian to Romanian, from Cyrillic to Latin,
caused controversy in the Transnistrian and Gagauzian regions.46 These groups had never
been Romanian and had never spoken Romanian or used the Latin alphabet. While
approximately 75% of Moldovans spoke Russian, very few Transnistrians knew how to
speak Romanian.47 There was a feeling amongst Russians in Moldova “that giving
Romanian superior (or even equal) status to Russian was just the first step toward union
with Romania. Fear of such a union resulted in a strong Russian reaction.”48
43

Ibid.
Ibid. p. 310.
45 Charles King, “The Politics of Language in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic,” in Studies in
Moldovan, ed. Donald L. Dyer, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 111-130.
46 Ibid.
47 Chin, “Politics,” p. 310.
48 Ibid.
44

!22

The Moldovan nationalist movement became more organized and more antiRussian. It became known as the Popular Front, organizing widespread popular support
for the language legislation, which threatened Russians, Ukrainians, and Gagauzi: ethnic
groups living inside Moldova who now began to fear having to learn and live by another
language other than their own native one.49 The Popular Front acknowledged the purpose
of the new language laws, [Moldova was still the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic
(MSSR) at the time of the drafting of this legislation]:
…eliminating the deformations that have occurred in language policy in the
MSSR, taking the Moldovan language (one of the fundamental premises of the
existence of the Moldovan nation in the framework of its national-state formation)
under the protection of the state, guaranteeing its functioning in all spheres on the
territory of the MSSR, and regulating national-linguistic relations in the republic.50

!

This nationalist push through language legislation would soon lead to independence
movements in the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia in the south of Moldova.
Competing Political Agendas

!

Activists began to mobilize, and, in the region of Gagauzia, a call for a greater

degree of regional autonomy began.51 This movement led to “leaders of the Gagauz and
Russian minorities called for both Russian and Moldovan [Romanian] to be made equal
state languages, rather than relegating Russian to the secondary position of ‘language of
inter-ethnic communication.’ The Gagauz prepared to declare their own autonomous
republic.”52 Despite these pockets of resistance in Gagauzia and Transnistria, the
Moldovan Parliament declared Moldovan [Romanian] the official state language “used in
49
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political, economic, social and cultural life and functioning on the basis of the Latin
script.”53
This move by Parliament was seen by the Gagauz and the Transnistrians as an
effort against the two minority groups, considered pro-Russian.54 Independence
movements by Moldova from the Soviet Union, and by Gagauzia and Transnistria from
Moldova geared up and would soon result in two potential de facto states within
Moldova’s borders. As Moldova continued to distance itself from Moscow, Gagauzia and
Transnistria continued to resist, bolstered by Russian support. Language, in this case, was
only a catalyst. “Over the past fifty years, the position of ethnic Russians in the MSSR
had climbed steadily, at the expense of the republic’s ethnic majority. In fact, of all the
union republics, only Kazakhstan ranked below Moldova in the percentage of the
republican leadership formed by the titular nationality.”55 This was not a major issue
politically while Moldova was a Soviet republic.
The political climate in the Moldovan Supreme Soviet56 began to shift in 1990.
The Communist Party began to lose support, and “twenty-seven percent of all seats in the
Supreme Soviet were taken by open supporters of the Front; along with moderate
Communist party deputies, mainly from rural districts, reformists commanded a majority
of seats.”57 There were also pro-Soviet representatives looking after the interests of
Transnistria and Gagauzia who formed a small opposition, but the reformists would gain
complete control when these deputies “walked out in protest over Romanian-oriented
53

Ibid. p. 159.
Ibid. pp. 147-167.
55 Ibid.
56 The Supreme Soviet was the name given to the legislative bodies of Soviet States.
57 King, The Moldovans. p. 146
54

!24

cultural reforms.”58 These reforms would initially create a cultural and ethnic divide
within Moldovan society: “In one survey, 54.8 percent of Moldovans but only 8.8 percent
of Russians and 8.4 percent of Ukrainians favored independence.”59
Despite having won 40% of the mandates in the March 1990 elections to the
Moldovan Supreme Soviet, the Front began to lose power as a result of the emergence of
a radicalized faction advocating unification with Romania.60 Though it was a popular idea
at the beginning of 1990, by 1991, the idea had lost public opinion support, and the elites
began advocating a completely sovereign Moldova with “strong cultural ties with
Romania.”61

The next move by the Moldovan parliament would precede the declaration

of independence: a vote to change the name of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic to
the Republic of Moldova.62 Moldovan independence was declared on August 27, 1991.63
Conflicting Ideas Lead to War

!

The political ramifications of the new language laws, the reformist legislature’s

move toward independence, and the palpable weakening of the Soviet Union would all
result in increased conflict in Moldova. As Transnistria and Gagauzia prepared to
implement governmental structures independent of those in Chisinau, tensions rose.64 The
opposition in the Gagauzian region would eventually be solved through the granting of
greater autonomy. It would become apparent that Transnistria would not settle short of
58

Ibid.
Ibid. p. 147.
60 Marius Vahl and Michael Emerson. “Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict.” In Europeanization and
Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery, edited by Bruno Coppieters, Michael
Emerson, Michel Huysseune, Tamara Kovziridze, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, and Maruis Vahl,
148-184. (Gent: Academia Press, 2004), p. 5.
61 Ibid. p. 6.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
59

!25

independence. Because the focus of this thesis is on Transnistria, I will leave the
Gagauzia conflict here, but want to note that it has as complex a history as the
Transnistria one. As Chisinau, Moldova’s capital, continued making moves to distance
itself from the Soviet Union and Moscow, Transnistria would counter with moves which
pushed them further away from Chisinau.65
These moves would lead to minor violent clashes between Moldovan police
forces and Transnistrian forces in the late 1990s which lead to Transnistrian authorities
gaining control of “public institutions such as municipal and local administrative
buildings, police stations, schools, newspapers and radio stations…”66 Moldovan forces
were unable to overcome the Transnistrian forces and drew back prior to the violence
escalating further. Following Moldova’s declaration of independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, elections were held. Transnistria followed suit, holding elections of its
own, electing Igor Smirnov as President in the Transnistrian “capital” of Tiraspol, while,
in Chisinau, Mircea Snegur was elected President.67 These elections led to armed
confrontations between Moldovan and Transnistrian forces, and war broke out in June of
1992. “The principal and decisive battle took place in Bender/Tighina68 on June 19-21,
and, with the support of the Russian 14th Army, Transnistrian forces were able to push
back the Moldovan forces and retain control of Transnistria. Moscow participated in
negotiations which eventually, and relatively quickly, led to a cease-fire agreement
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between Moldova and Transnistria in July of 1992. The 14th Army was stationed in
Transnistria indefinitely in a “peacekeeping capacity.”69
Prior to the cease-fire, a collaborative meeting between Foreign Ministers from
Moldova, Ukraine, which shares a border with Moldova/Transnistria, Romania, which
shares a border with Moldova, and Russia took place with ministers from the Council for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the predecessor to the OSCE. In an effort to
reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the parties involved agreed to establish a
Quadripartite Commission and to send “a group of five military observers from each
country to monitor an eventual cease-fire agreement…”70 These advances toward peace
did not last long, and by June of 1992 the fighting intensified. Moldova requested further
help from the CSCE, which would only come following an effective cease-fire
agreement.71 This was not possible, and the request was rejected by the CSCE, which
prompted Moldova to seek Russia’s assistance in brokering a cease-fire.
An official cease-fire and the creation of a cooperative effort between Moldova,
Transnistria, and Russia was reached between Presidents Snegur and Yeltsin on July 21,
1992.72 This agreement established a Joint Control Commission (JCC), made up of
delegations from Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia, as well as groups of ten military
observers from each party, who would monitor the cease-fire.73 In support of the JCC, a
Trilateral Military Command comprised of three battalions each from Moldova,
Transnistria and Russia were deployed to assist in the implementation and perpetuation of
69
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the cease-fire agreement.74 While there have been minimal minor incidents since the
cease-fire, there has been no large-scale violence in the region. The cease-fire continues
to be respected today making the Transnistria conflict a frozen one. Despite numerous
negotiations and agreements indicating a timeline for the withdrawal of Russian troops,
the 14th army still remains, against the wishes of the Moldovan government, acting in a
“peacekeeping capacity.”75
Status of Today’s Frozen Conflict

!

The conflict between Moldova and Transnistria has not been “hot” for over two

decades, but this does not mean it has gone unnoticed. There have been many attempts to
reach a settlement, and many parties have offered assistance. In 1993, direct talks were
initiated between Moldovan authorities and Transnistrian leadership.76 Both sides,
however, rejected offers coming from the other. Moldova refused to compromise its
territorial integrity for the sake of Transnistrian independence, and Transnistria would not
accept the special status granting a large degree of autonomy from Moldova.77 From 1993
to 1994, several talks took place between Moldova, Transnistria, the newly established
CSCE Mission to Moldova,78 and Russia, but these talks stalled in 1995.79
Similar fruitless meetings continued to occur through the rest of the 1990s until
the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999 which resulted in Russia committing to the
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“withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment in Moldova. The weapons of the forces in
the region were to be removed by the end of 2001 and personnel and stockpiled
equipment by late 2002.”80 In the early 2000s, more meetings took place and more
proposals were offered and rejected by each side. Today, “de facto secession and nonrecognized independence for Transnistria describes the status quo.”81 An unwillingness to
accept anything less than the greatest demand continues to ensure that neither side will
concede to the other. Moldova will not compromise its territorial integrity, and
Transnistria will settle for nothing short of independence. Today, we watch as a decadesold conflict remains frozen and wonder for how long this particular status quo will
persist.
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Chapter Three: The New Neighborhood and its Terms

!
The European Union Begins Considering the Post-Soviet Space
!

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many newly independent former

Soviet states began expressing European ambitions, including the desire for EU
membership. This was a lofty goal for these states in transition, as moving from statecontrol and a planned economy to building democratic institutions and a market economy
would take time. It would also be extremely difficult in many cases, especially those with
internal conflicts, like Moldova. During the Cold War, Europe was “differentiated by
ideological preferences/influences of Western Europe (European Communities and
NATO) and Central and Eastern European states controlled by the USSR.”82 The collapse
of the Soviet Union presented a unique opportunity for Western Europe, one that seemed
welcomed by the post-Soviet states, to liberalize and stabilize the space, spreading
democratic ideals and encouraging market economies. “After 1989, the European Union
was immediately ready to integrate and incorporate Central and Eastern Europe in order
to stabilize peace on the continent and to build its own production network.”83
The EU began helping these countries in the post-Soviet space work through the
difficult transition, encouraging them to embrace the acquis communautaire, the EU’s

82

Dorin Ioan Dolghi, Gilles Rouet, & Zsolt Radics, Editors. “Europe and the Neighborhood,” compiled by
University of Oradea and University of Debrecen for the Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies at
the “Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence. (Spring, 2009.0
83 Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union, p. 2.

!30

legal and institutional requirements for membership. Working towards achieving these
high standards led to the opening of markets, giving these transitionary states access to
European markets. This helped bolster economies encouraged the further implementation
of liberal institutions necessary for a functioning democracy.
Eastern Enlargement 2004-2013

!

“Enlargement serves the interests of Member States as well as acceding countries.

It makes Europe a safer and more prosperous place, in particular through its promotion of
democracy and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the single market.”84 Eastern
enlargement expanding into the post-Soviet space presents many opportunities and
challenges. It brings the EU closer to subpar economies and instability.
By 2002, eight Central European countries had successfully achieved the
requirements set by the acquis communautaire: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.85 May 1, 2004 saw the first EU
enlargement into the post-Soviet space as the EU signed all eight of these countries into
membership. This was not only huge for the eight new members, but also for the other
nations now sharing borders with the EU: membership for states in the post-Soviet space
was not only a possibility, it had become a reality.
The enlargement was not without problems. Some of the new members faced
fiscal issues of inflation or mounting deficits immediately upon entry into the EU.
Several of the new members did not introduce the Euro right away, and some still do not
84
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operate on the Euro today. In the next round of enlargement, two more states from the
Eastern Bloc, Bulgaria and Romania, where admitted in to the Union. This enlargement
took place in 2007, and these two countries were the poorest the EU had ever admitted.86
The most recent enlargement of the EU saw Croatia admitted in 2013, rounding out the
number of post-Soviet and Eastern Bloc members to nine (ten including East Germany,
which is now Germany after reunification.)
While there are definitely pockets of resistance to European Union membership in
the region, several states, including Moldova, have been working diligently to meet the
high standards of economic stability and democratic functionality mandated by the acquis
communautaire. These pockets of resistance continue to pose problems for aspiring
member states. The Transnistria conflict, though “frozen” for quite some time, is no
exception. De facto states and secessionist conflicts are absolute deal-breakers for EU
membership, and Moldova has been working since the ceasefire to overcome its biggest
obstacle to membership.
European Ambitions and Dangling Carrots

!

Moldova has been expressing European ambitions since the declaration of its

independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The idea that peace and prosperity would
result from further integration with Europe was founded in the recognition of the peace
and prosperity enjoyed by her member states for decades prior. The EU also recognized
the opportunity for increased influence in the post-Soviet space and began working with
several of these newly independent nations, Moldova included, shortly thereafter.
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In 1998, the European Commission ratified a Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) with Moldova which was designed to encourage the most basic
fundamentals of the acquis communautaire. The agreement was signed on November 28,
1994, and provided for “a basis of cooperation with the EU in the political, commercial,
economic, legal, cultural and scientific areas.”87 The plan was to be in place for the next
10 years to facilitate Moldova’s transition toward more European ideals.88 This advance
toward Europeanization, developing a functioning market economy, creating a more
democratic system of government and elections, improving the condition of civil society
and the respect for human rights, and elevating the judicial system to European standards
would take quite some time, and the EU was aware. Moldova’s accession into the Union
would not be the topic of conversation for years to come.
In 2005, it became apparent that one of Moldova’s neighbors, Romania, was
being considered for membership in the next enlargement. This would result in Moldova
sharing a direct border with a member state. This would present a new challenging
opportunity for Moldova and increase aspirations for membership.89 The PCA was set to
expire and, though it was limited, Moldova had made progress. The Transnistria conflict
was still an issue and had made zero progress toward a resolution. But the fact still
remained: Moldova was about to be an EU neighbor. This would need to be addressed in
a way that not only benefited Moldova, but also the EU and her members as well.
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In 2004, a new effort was begun by the EU to help Moldova further improve its
conditions toward a European goal. “It is in the European interest that countries on the
EU’s borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak
states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies (…) all pose problems
for Europe.”90 Recognizing the need to become involved in the states on the prospective
new borders of the EU with the forthcoming 2007 enlargement, which would see
admittance of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU began developing its new initiative for the
region: the Eastern Neighborhood Policy. The new ENP would allow neighboring states
to work with the EU via ENP Action Plans to “achieve the closest possible political
association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration…[building] on
common interests and on values - democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights,
and social cohesion.”91
The ENP Action Plans were long documents addressing each individual country’s
particular issues regarding each sector of concern, from economics to security,
democracy and rule of law to civil society, even environmental, infrastructure, and energy
concerns. The overall goal of the ENPs was to demonstrate a firm commitment to the
basics of acquis communautaire by way of benchmarks to be attained over a period of
three to five years. The support of the EU was also demonstrated via allocated financial
support, economic integration by way of access to EU markets, travel liberation through
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the issue of Shengen visas to 3.2 million citizens of the Neighborhood,92 and technical
and policy support.93 This biggest issue taken with the ENP and its action plans was the
absence of demonstrated prospective Association Agreements upon successful
implementation of the plans. They were often seen as “dangling carrots” to achieve
increased influence on the part of the EU in the region with no guarantee of membership
based on the outcome of the plans.
The ENP: Action Plans with Little Action

!

On February 22, 2005, Moldova signed its ENP Action Plan with the EU. Set in

the context of a “strategic partnership,”94 Moldova was in need of support in order to
implement the necessary democratic institutions, the fundamentals for a functioning
market economy, respect and protection of human rights, a strong, fair, and transparent
judiciary, and to resolve internal de facto state conflict with Transnistria. Moldova’s
Action Plan includes frequent mentions of the Transnistria conflict and the need for a
multilateral approach to resolution and it stresses the importance of democratic ideals as a
factor of potential stabilization. The EU had been working with the OSCE prior to the
Action Plan being put into place. Included in the “New Partnership Perspectives” section
of the plan was a commitment to “Continuing strong EU commitment to support the
settlement of the Transnistria conflict, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal,
and in close consultation with the OSCE. The EU is ready to consider ways to strengthen
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further its engagement.”95 It also notes under the “Priorities for Action” section that
“particular attention should be given to sustained efforts towards a viable solution to the
Transnistria conflict,”96 first in a list of ten priorities.
Moldova’s Action Plan stresses the importance of democracy and the rule of law,
which is immediately followed by a section on “cooperation on foreign and security
policy, conflict prevention and crisis management.”97 In this section, there is a clear
demonstration of the importance of continued cooperation between the EU, the OSCE,
Moldova, and Transnistria. The EU pledges its help regarding the Transnistria conflict
while continuing to respect and retain the territorial sovereignty of Moldova “within its
internationally recognized borders.”98 Part of this attempt had begun previously with the
“5 + 2” negotiations organized by the OSCE. This was an attempt to involve all interested
parties: Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE (the “five”) with the EU
and the United States acting as observers (the “plus two”), in a settlement resolution
negotiation.99 The Action Plan suggested furthering this approach, as well as working to
encourage Russia to follow through on an earlier promise to withdraw its 14th Army,100
who have been acting as “peacekeepers” along the disputed border since the early 1990s.
There is also special attention payed to the potential security threats which arise
on the border of Transnistria and Ukraine and Transnistria and Moldova. The Action Plan
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also committed to working with EUBAM, the European Union Border Assistance
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, to further combat instability on Moldova’s borders.101
The plan is quite lengthy and also considers economic, rule of law, human rights,
trafficking, and other factors. The significant focus on the Transnistria conflict signifies
the importance of its resolution. In order to advance Moldova into a functioning
democracy ready for EU membership consideration the conflict would need to be
addressed. The PCA formed the basis for the Action Plan, though “new partnership
perspectives” were introduced, and they included “Continuing strong EU commitment to
support the settlement of the Transnistria conflict, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s
disposal, and in close consultation with the OSCE. The EU is ready to consider ways to
strengthen further its engagement.”102
In the early sections of the Action Plan the Transnistria conflict is briefly
addressed. Under the heading “Priorities for Action,” which “sets out a comprehensive set
of priorities in areas within the scope of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,”103
it is the first item listed: “sustained efforts towards a viable solution to the Transnistria
conflict.”104 Further down, a preface to the cooperative efforts requested by Moldova and
Ukraine to strengthen the shared border, which will be discussed in the “EUBAM:
Securing Borders in Effort to Stabilize” section of this chapter: “progress towards a
system of efficient, comprehensive state border management on all sectors of the
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Moldovan border including the Transnistrian sector.”105 Under section “2.1 Political
dialogue and reform,” and under the heading, “Democracy and the Rule of law,” the first
item, “(1) Strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing
democracy and the rule of law,” it is stated: “In the context of the efforts for a settlement
of the Transnistria issue, ensure constitutional and legislative reform in line with
European standards, continuing to draw on the expert cooperation and advice of the
Venice Commission106 and the EU, and ensuring a democratic and stable constitutional
framework both for citizen and state institutions in (a re-united) Moldova.”107 Under the
heading, “Co-operation on foreign and security policy, conflict prevention and crisis
management,” there are two separate items listed in regard to section (13) “Strengthen
political dialogue and co-operation on foreign and security policy issues.” The first,
“Continue and develop political dialogue and cooperation with the EU on Transnistria,
regional and international issues, including within the framework of Council of Europe
and OSCE,”108 alludes to support for continued efforts of the “5 + 2” negotiations. The
second item is more general, demonstrating a need for preventative action in order to
avoid further conflicts from arising: “Work with the EU to make multilateral institutions
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and conventions more effective, so as to reinforce global governance, strengthen
coordination in combating security threats and address related development issues;”109
This item encourages Moldova to work with the institutions outside of the EU (like the
OSCE) to progress toward stability.
In section 2.2 of the plan titled, “2.2 Co-operation for the settlement of the
Transnistria conflict,” the issue is addressed in more depth, though there are little
specifics as far as demonstrable calls to action. In fact, a majority of the responsibility is
left with the OSCE, which has been operating in the region since the beginning of the
conflict. While the EU demonstrates a willingness to support the efforts of the OSCE,
there is little specificity. With regard to border controls, the EU does take action in 2005
with the establishment of EUBAM, which will be discussed in depth later in this chapter.
Here are the specifics of Section 2.2:
(16) Sustained efforts towards a settlement of the Transnistria conflict, respecting
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its
internationally recognized borders, and guaranteeing respect for democracy, the
rule of law, and human rights.
- Constructive participation of Moldova, together with the other party and
mediators in the OSCE-led negotiation process aimed at reaching a settlement
of the Transnistria conflict [5 + 2 negotiations between Moldova, Transnistria,
Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE with the EU and the United States as observers];
- Effective co-operation between the EU and Moldova towards a settlement of
the Transnistria conflict within agreed formats, including consultation on postsettlement arrangements and guarantees as appropriate.
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- EU to further step up its involvement in supporting the OSCE and mediators in
-

-

!

this process, assist the efforts of the Joint Constitutional Commission110, and to
prepare engagement in post-settlement scenario;
EU to continue its efforts to ensure the fulfillment by Russia of the Istanbul
commitments111 with regard to Moldova.
Reinforce political dialogue between the EU and Moldova on the Transnistria
conflict.
Significant further progress with Ukraine on pending border questions along
the Transnistrian border section; strengthen cooperation with Ukrainian
administration including effective exchange of information about flow of goods
and people across the common border. Active engagement in the trilateral talks
Moldova - Ukraine - European Commission concerning measures to ensure
proper management and control of Moldova’s entire border with Ukraine, in
particular the Transnistria section.112
Support the active involvement of civil society and the promotion of
democratic values and respect for human rights.

These parameters, while valuable and ambitious, lack a clear plan of action. There
is great advocacy for the cooperation with the OSCE and clear identification of many of
the issues to overcome. However, to be termed an “Action Plan,” this presents little in the
way of tangible action, and reads more like a statement of vague support from the EU.

!
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The OSCE: Working Towards Peace

!

In the 1970s, during the tension and lack of discourse between the East and West

of the Cold War, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was
created to provide and encourage multilateral “dialogue and negotiation between East and
West.”113 Until the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union the CSCE
functioned as a series of conferences which aimed at increasing peace, stability, and
cooperation between states. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union it was evident that the
CSCE could provide even more assistance as an institutional body, and, during this
conversion process, changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) in 1994.114
The responsibilities and goals of the OSCE are wide-ranging, but all contribute to
the larger idea of peace, stability, and cooperation between the nations of Europe. The
OSCE factors into this study with regard to its efforts toward conflict prevention and
resolution, which were major components of the ENP Action Plan between Moldova and
the EU. The OSCE established its Mission to Moldova in 1993 in effort to assist in the
peaceful negotiation of a “lasting political settlement of the Transnistria conflict, to
consolidate the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, and to reach
an understanding on a special status for Transnistria. The Mission engages in diplomacy mostly silent - to foster dialogue and defuse tensions.”115
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One of the most active roles the OSCE has taken in the Transnistria conflict is the
facilitation of its multilateral negotiations. In 2004, official negotiations began between
Moldova and Transnistria, with the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine acting as mediators.
“Proposals and Recommendations” were published on February 13, 2004, illustrating the
objectives of the talks, which aimed at reaching a peaceful political solution to the
conflict. The talks and resulting report reflected the challenges to be addressed in order to
progress toward a solution, and included focuses on several sectors needing attention:
reuniting Moldova as a democratic state based on the rule of law, respect for human
rights, a market based on free economic activity, respect for private property, and
minimum standards for government provisions for the general welfare of the people.116
There were also special provisions made for Transnistria in effort to appease some of the
demands for independence.
The recommendations made regarding Transnistria were not ultimately accepted,
but included a much larger degree of autonomy than had previously been agreed upon by
Moldova. This included the establishment of “its own organs of authority and of
government to the federal subject within the framework of the Constitution of the Federal
State,”117 and similar provisions, basically integrating the already established de facto
government and its operations into the federal government of Moldova, adhering to the
constitutional requirements of Moldova, and with ultimate power lying in the hands of
the Moldovan government. This is where the disconnect begins and is the main reason
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Transnistria would ultimately walk away from negotiations. At this point, nothing but full
independence would be acceptable.
In 2006, these negotiations expanded and became known as the “5+2” talks,
which are discussions between Moldova and Transnistria, and include Russia, Ukraine
and the OSCE as mediators and the United States and the European Union as observers.
The “5+2” talks have been the primary vehicle for conflict settlement negotiations
between Moldova and Transnistria, but have not always been fruitful. Negotiations,
which began in 2005, were stalled in 2006 when official negotiations were discontinued
by the Transnistrian side, who “refused to continue negotiations after the March
introduction of new customs rules for Transnistrian exports, and thus no progress could
be made including on these projects.”118 These vital talks would remain stalled until
September 22, 2011, when a formal renewal decision was made by all parties to resume
the negotiation talks in the 5+2 format.119
The OSCE Mission to Moldova also works to help stabilize the region in ways
besides direct negotiation between the various parties. Confidence-building measures
attempt to help facilitate a greater cooperation between the people of Moldova and the
people of Transnistria outside of basic government agreements. The Mission also works
on arms control and disarmament, including attempts at reaching the agreements
stipulated by the Istanbul Summit Declaration on the part of Russian forces in the region.
Limited withdrawals of weapons and troops have been made, but much progress is
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needed in order to fulfill the agreements made. Human rights, democratization, freedom
of the media, gender equality and anti-trafficking measures are also important focuses of
the OSCE, but they will not be discussed in depth in this thesis as they do not fit into the
focus of direct efforts to resolve the conflict in Transnistria.120
EUBAM: Securing Borders in Effort to Stabilize

!

On November 7, 2005, following a joint request by the Presidents of Ukraine and

Moldova, the EU activated a new effort in the efforts to stabilize the Transnistria conflict
and to create cooperation between Transnistria, Moldova, and neighboring Ukraine. The
European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was
developed in order to help facilitate border control activities through mutual cooperation
of all parties. Much of the instability in the region had been perpetuated by the lack of
formal control of the border between what is territorially Moldova and Ukraine. The
separatist movement would be significantly less successful without the support of
political and financial elites, not only in Transnistria, but also those in Moldova, Ukraine,
and Russia who both support it and benefit from it: “…there are hopes that the EUBAM
can also contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistria conflict by reducing the
illegal revenue which Transnistrian (but also Moldovan, Ukrainian and Russian) political
and business elites derive from these illicit activities, and by creating the conditions for
Transnistria to reintegrate Moldova’s customs space.”121
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Many of these elites, as well as local separatists on the ground, benefit from the
illicit activities facilitated by a weak and poorly controlled border. These are exactly the
conditions which lead to the request for EUBAM. As a de facto state, Transnistria is a
“diplomatically isolated haven for transnational criminals and possibly terrorists.”122
Lucrative illegal smuggling of contraband, such as untaxed cigarettes and drugs, the
movement of arms to support the separatists should another hot conflict arise, and the
trafficking of humans are a few of the biggest problems faced by the EUBAM staff.123
The revenue provided through these illicit activities not only contributes to the
Transnistrian economy, but helps fatten the pockets of the aforementioned elites.
EUBAM seeks to close the holes in the border where these activities are taking place,
better regulate the flow of goods through strengthened customs controls, and help
encourage business relationships between Moldova and Transnistria which would
alleviate the need for smugglers to work around the border controls.
Moldova had been complaining for quite some time about the lack of control by
the Ukrainians of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border; that many exported Transnistrian
goods were being allowed across despite not having the proper official documentation
and customs stamps issued by Moldova.124 The two parties held a meeting in Odessa,
Ukraine, where they agreed on “mutual access to the markets of both countries and…on
implementing joint border control.”125 This would result in the request to the EU and
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formation of EUBAM as a mutually cooperative between Moldova, Ukraine, and the EU
to secure the border and to address many of the issues resulting from the lack of border
controls by elevating the border and customs services to the level of European “best
practice standards.”126
The Transnistria conflict makes EUBAM operations slightly trickier than they
may be otherwise, were they dealing exclusively with two cooperative states. As stated
previously, Transnistria and many elites reap great benefit from the lack of formality and
strict control at the border. There must be careful consideration paid to the political
climate of the region in addition to the security concerns which would typically come
with attempting to regulate an illicit “black” market. Due, in part, to these political and
security concerns, to keep the EUBAM staff safe and able to effectively work in the
region, the EUBAM holds no executive powers, and may only request extended checks
and re-examinations of cargo. They do, however, provide extensive training to the
authorities of Moldova and Ukraine who are assigned to patrol the border, and also
observe the quality of customs clearance and border checks.127
The official aims of the EUBAM are in an advisory capacity only and are as
follows:128

- To work with Moldova and Ukraine to harmonize their border management
standards and procedures with those prevalent in EU member states

- To help enhance the professional capacities of the Moldovan and Ukrainian
customs and border guard services at operational level

- To develop risk analysis capacity
126
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- To improve cooperation and complementarity between the border guard and
-

!

customs services and with other law enforcement agencies
To promote cross-border cooperation.

These goals are set not only in a security-increasing capacity, but also in a confidencebuilding capacity, to encourage cooperation between all parties involved: Moldova,
Ukraine and Transnistria. Increasing the levels of legitimate trade cooperation between
Moldova and Transnistria will promote stability and prosperity on both sides of the
conflict, and move both sides closer to a resolution.
The ENP, the OSCE, and the EUBAM all seek to encourage, alongside many
goals, a stabilization of the tensions between Moldova and Transnistria in an effort to
reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The territorial integrity of Moldova is
considered very important, but there is responsible acknowledgment of the disconnect
between the two societies. The people of Transnistria have less of a connection to
Romania or Moldova than the Moldovan population outside of the region, so a lot of the
potential for progress lies within the improved relationship between the two. Confidencebuilding measures and a clear demonstration of respect are vital.

!
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Chapter Four: Making Progress or Standing Still?
Chapter Three discussed the creation of the ENP Action Plans, the cooperation
encouraged by the Action Plans between Moldova and the OSCE in achieving the goals
set out in the Action Plans, and the creation at the joint request of Moldova and Ukraine
for the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. Each entity
documented the progress made from its own point of view and published progress reports
annually. In this chapter I consider the factors related to the Transnistria conflict and
evaluated the progress made based on these reports.
Annual ENP Progress Reports
In a November 22, 2005 “Communication to the Commission: Implementing and
promoting the European Neighborhood Policy,” The Commission of the European
Communities notes that “the Government of Moldova has made the ENP Action Plan the
centerpiece of its reform strategy.”129 This, of course, was not a unilateral effort and
would require a substantial amount of support in order to be effective. The EU published
progress reports annually documenting Moldova’s progress in meeting the goals
articulated within the ENP Action Plan.
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I have chosen to focus on the following goals of the ENP Action Plan in
evaluating the progress of the Action Plan efforts: (listed in order of appearance in the
Action Plan with regard to the Transnistria conflict.)
1. Improve an open political dialogue between Moldova and the EU
2. Encourage progress with OSCE-organized 5+2 negotiations
3. Support the commitments made at Istanbul Summit regarding Russian tanks,
troops, and arms withdrawals (no progress made)
4. Reinforce political dialogue between Moldova and Transnistria in effort to reach a
peaceful settlement to the conflict.
5. Active involvement in civil society by encouraging a respect for human rights and
the promotion of democratic values (confidence-building).130
* Management and control of the Moldova-Ukraine border is also listed in the ENP,
which resulted in the creation of EUBAM. While border issues are evaluated in the ENP
Progress Reports, much of the information is duplicated in the EUBAM Progress
Reports. For the sake of clarity in this thesis, I will keep the evaluation of EUBAM
progress under the section titled “EUBAM Progress: and will base my evaluation off of
EUBAM reports.
The first progress report was issued on December 4, 2006. At the beginning of the
report it is acknowledged that the internal and external conditions of Moldova present a
difficult challenge with regard to the implementation of the Plan. Limited progress was
made in the first year of the Plan and “implementation of reform strategies remain(s) a
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problem.”131 The report notes that some progress was made via intensified political
dialogue via bi-annual consultations between Moldova and the EU Political and Security
Committee and the Council working group in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The EU
appointed a Special Representative for Moldova to observe in the 5+2 negotiations being
facilitated by the OSCE. Part of the EU efforts also included the successful launch of
EUBAM at the request of the Prime Ministers of Moldova and Ukraine. EUBAM
progress will be specifically discussed in a later section of this chapter, but it is noted in
the ENP Progress Reports as well.
Though the initial year of the ENP Action Plan did not show great gains in
Moldova, it is obvious that the effort was there and that some, albeit limited, progress
was present. This positive progress resulted in deeper commitments from the EU to
further bolster Moldova’s efforts. An increased assistance package would come in 2007,
the European Commission approved a grant designed to “address the looming financial
gap.”132 Progress for Moldova would not come easily, but the 2006 progress report shows
indications of EU commitment and Moldovan efforts to reach European standards.
In 2007 Moldova cooperated closely with the EU on all questions related to the
Transnistria settlement efforts. Authorities worked on improving confidence levels
through joint confidence-building measures with the EU, the OSCE and EUBAM.133
There was active cooperation on all regional and international issues with the EU, and
Moldova cooperated closely with the EU on all questions related to the Transnistria issue
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settlement efforts, despite the stalling of the 5+2 negotiations in 2006. The EU also
extended the EUBAM mandate through 2009.134 No progress was made regarding the
Istanbul Summit issues.
The progress made in 2007 is similar to that made in 2006: though the steps made
were small, they were important, and demonstrated a fervent commitment by Moldova to
continue to improve. Moldova’s willingness to work toward achieving the results sought
after via the ENP Action Plan was obvious, and was demonstrated despite the absence of
cooperation from Transnistria. This type of participation would only continue to improve
conditions in Moldova.
2007 also saw the publication of a new “Country Strategy Paper” for Moldova by
the EU. It was to last from 2007 to 2013, and signified an even further commitment to
increased relations and improved conditions in Moldova. The paper addresses the
Transnistria conflict, but does not go into great depth as to what direct actions will be
taken regarding the conflict. The conflict is discussed in the context of the European
Security Strategy,135 acknowledging “great importance to the resolution of the
Transnistria conflict and [the EU] is actively involved in ongoing efforts to achieve a
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settlement, amongst other things through an EU Border Assistance Mission on the
Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including the Transnistrian section.”136 The paper includes a
stated commitment on the part of the European Community to “continue its current
strong engagement in support of a settlement of the Transnistria conflict, in full respect of
Moldova’s territorial integrity.”137 The “Country Strategy Paper” is a clear demonstration
of the EU’s support of Moldova in its efforts to liberalize and to settle the Transnistria
conflict. However, like the ENP Action Plan, little specifics are included as to how these
goals will be reached.
The progress reports of 2006 and 2007 saw little progress, but did acknowledge
that there was, indeed, progress. The report in 2008 was less positive: “Nonetheless,
Moldova made no or limited progress in the effective implementation of a number of
reforms which constitute key priorities under the ENP Action Plan.”138 It is noted
throughout much of the report that the measures taken towards implementation of these
reforms during 2006 and 2007 saw little to no monitoring by the government since
implementation, which is likely the cause for the absence of progress in 2008. Moldova’s
economy, which is largely agrarian, was also severely affected by a long-lasting drought,
which contributed to the internal issues as well.139 Despite these internal setbacks,
Moldova was an active participant in regional and international issues, cooperating with
the EU “on all questions related to the Transnistria settlement efforts.”140
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While limited or no progress was made in most sectors needing reforms, Moldova
continued to cooperate with the EU on regional and international issues. For the first time
in seven years the President of Moldova and the separatist leader of Transnistria
conducted meetings. Though this was on an informal basis (the 5+2 talks remained
stalled), progress was made. “Pursuing its confidence-building initiative put forward in
autumn 2007, Moldova agreed with the separatist authorities to set up five bilateral
working groups. The Government foresaw a specific allocation in the 2009 state budget
to facilitate the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.”141 This cooperation between the
two sides, though informal, marked very positive progress in a year which saw little.
Moldova experienced more internal issues in 2009, including disputed election
results, which put a halt to many government activities. In response to street riots
concerning the elections, law enforcement committed “serious violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms…before repeat elections allowed a stable parliamentary
majority to be formed and a start was made on stabilizing the domestic and external
political situation.”142 These internal struggles had a negative impact in the
implementation of the ENP reforms at the beginning of 2009: “EU-Moldova relations
suffered for most of the year, before picking up again after the appointment of the new
Government. Subsequently, political dialogue with the EU and the Moldovan authorities’
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interaction with international institutions have increased.”143 Efforts were stepped up
during the last quarter of 2009 once the internal governmental issues were stabilized.144
The new government “was appointed on a strong European integration
platform,”145 which was a positive advance for Moldova. 2009 also saw two more
informal meetings between Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders, and an agreement was
reached to continue these regular bilateral meetings. Further cooperation was
demonstrated with the “coordinated support [of] the two packages of EU sponsored
confidence-building projects launched in 2009.”146 Moldova also lifted the time limit
restrictions on the legislation passed in 2007 which allowed Transnistrian-based
companies to temporarily register in Chisinau in order to benefit from trade across the
disputed border.147
The 2010 progress report starts out much more positively, given the resolution of
many of the internal conflicts which had impacted progress in 2009. It is clearly
demonstrated that the EU views Moldova’s progress as positive as well, as “negotiations
on a future EU-Republic of Moldova Association Agreement were launched in January
2010, and negotiations since have been progressing at a very good pace.”148 Association
Agreements are typically seen as the next logical step to membership candidacy,
something Moldova has been striving for since declaring its independence from the
Soviet Union in 1991. The willingness of the EU to entertain the idea of a Moldovan
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Association Agreement is a clear indication of the positive progress made in the context
of the ENP. The Transnistria conflict, however, continued (and still does today) to present
a challenge.
While Moldova was successful in electing a pro-European Prime Minister in
2009, there was still no resolution to the 2009 political stalemate between the various
parties over the election of a President. This issue aside, the EU notes that “good progress
overall in most areas of the Action Plan”149 was made. Moldova continued to participate
in Transnistria-related issues at a level that was satisfactory to the EU, and participation
in the 5+2 meetings continued in an informal capacity. A Depute Prime Minister in
Charge of the Transnistria Settlement was appointed and held frequent informal meetings
with the Transnistrian negotiator.150 Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities coordinated
joint support for several EU-sponsored confidence-building projects and reactivated
bilateral working groups to address sectoral dispute issues.151
2011 was a promising year for Moldova regarding the Transnistria conflict, as the
5+2 talks officially resumed. A formal invitation was extended for Moldova to “engage
pro-actively in a pragmatic dialogue with Tiraspol152 with a view to setting up effective
mechanisms to implement confidence building activities and making tangible progress
towards a comprehensive settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.”153 This advance was
seen as good progress by the EU, and several meetings took place over 2011. A major
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contributing factor to this progress was the election of a new leader in Transnistria, which
“may have in the medium term a positive impact on the negotiating process.”154
The presidential election stalemate of 2009 was finally resolved in 2012 when the
election of President Timofti provided some internal stability and allowed the Moldovan
government to concentrate on the necessary structural reforms which would contribute to
increased progress toward meeting European standards. This alone was viewed as
positive progress by the EU.
2012 saw the Moldovan efforts to reach a settlement to the Transnistria conflict
significantly increased, thanks in part to the cooperation of the new leadership in Tiraspol
and the resumption of the formal 5+2 negotiations. Five meetings were held and several
advances were made, including successful re-opening of freight-train routes through
Transnistria - the result of the negotiations started in 2011.155 Issues regarding the
freedom of movement between Moldova and Trasnistria, as well as reciprocity on the
recognition of university diplomas earned in Transnistria were also discussed but not
wholly resolved. These are small steps representing progress, but a “lack of shared vision
on the basic parameters for a comprehensive settlement help up progress on all issues,
and political and security issues were not addressed.”156 Tension was also revived when
discussion related to the removal of weapons, equipment, and foreign military troops was
raised, and the onset of this tension revival resulted in the diversion away from detailed
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negotiations. This meant there would be no change regarding demilitarization, which
continued to be an issue for Moldova.
In 2013, a new political crisis took place in Moldova when the Prime Minister,
accused of corruption, was removed by Parliament through a vote of no-confidence. This
resulted in the collapse of the Alliance for European Integration, the coalition built out of
the three non-communist parties in the government.157 Despite this setback, good
progress was still made “on significant and sensitive areas of the ENP Action Plan.”158
The situation was somewhat stabilized with the election of a new government in May of
2013, but internal conflicts between parties remained and tensions ran high.159
These tensions factored somewhat into the progress of the 5+2 talks, which
continued in 2013. The same “lack of shared vision on the basic parameters of a
comprehensive settlement”160 was still present in discussions over the Transnistria
conflict, and some of the measures implemented by Transnistria during 2013 contributed
to the rise in tensions between the two sides. Once again, the issue of language presented
itself as a divisive issue, with Transnistria challenging area Moldovan schools which
operated using Romanian (Moldovan) and the Latin script, making the operation of these
schools more difficult than had been in the past.161 Overall, however, communication
between Chisinau and Tiraspol remained open and progress was considered positive.
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It is evident after evaluating the ENP Action Plan progress reports that the EU
views Moldova as a willing participant in enacting necessary reforms for further
European integration. The Transnistria conflict is consistently addressed, and, though
progress is noted year-over-year, a settlement to the conflict appears far off. A major
problem with the ENP Action Plan is the lack of specificity with regard to measures to be
taken by Moldova to implement the necessary reform and make the necessary progress.
EU contributions are more or less in a supportive capacity, and, while there is some
financial support, much of the tangible progress is made via external agencies, including
the OSCE and the EUBAM.

Given the levels of tension existing in Moldova over the involvement of the EU
and the levels of disagreement over whether or not the ENP was going to be beneficial,
there has been progress in the key areas. In two of the six areas, “Some” to “Good”
progress was consistently made. Improving the dialogue between Moldova and
Transnistira, which relates directly to the resumption of the 5+2 negotiations, has shown
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overall progress, though in some years it was limited. Considering the levels of tension in
these sectors, I consider these levels of progress considerably positive. The most room for
improvement clearly lies within the fulfillment of the Istanbul Summit criteria, which has
seen zero progress. This will depend on cooperation from Russia, and, given the current
political climate, will likely remain status quo.
Progress of the OSCE
The OSCE has been a presence in Moldova since the late 1990s when it was
known as the CSCE. For the purpose of this thesis, I will consider the progress reports
issued since the signing of the ENP Action Plan162 and how the OSCE contributed to the
implementation of reforms within the Action Plan relating to the Transnistria conflict.
The efforts of the OSCE focus directly on security and cooperation between the sides,
and play a significant role in the 5+2 negotiations as a mediator. The 5+2 negotiations are
high on the list of importance each year for the OSCE, as they are viewed as one of the
most productive efforts toward reaching a settlement.
I have chosen to focus on the following goals of the OSCE in evaluating the
progress of efforts in Moldova: (listed in order of appearance in the OSCE Mission to
Moldova Factsheet.)
1. Productive participation of all parties in 5+2 negotiations
2. Confidence-building measures
3. Assist the Joint Control Commission (JCC)
4. Resolution to Istanbul Commitments (no progress made)
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Much of the work of the OSCE in 2006 on the Transnistria conflict focused on the
attempt to resume the 5+2 negotiations, which, after new customs regulations were
introduced by Moldova pertaining to Transnistrian exports, Transnistria refused to
participate in.163 The OSEC, in conjunction with the other mediators, Ukraine and Russia,
and the observers, the EU and the United States, attempted to unblock the resulting
stalemate to no avail.164 Separate attempts were made by the various actors in April, May,
and November, but there was no progress made. There was, however, agreement
facilitated by the OSCE and the JCC regarding the access of land in Transnistria which
was owned by Moldovan farmers. The farmers were granted access to the land via a
bilateral agreement.165
The OSCE continued its work in the role of an observer alongside the JCC, and
continued to assist in regulating disputes between the two sides.166 No withdrawals of
Russian weapons, equipment, or troops were made in 2006, resulting in a withdrawal of
funding by the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.167 The 5+2 stalemate and the lack of
progress made on the withdrawal of Russian forces in the region as stipulated in the
Istanbul Summit agreement are seen as representing little progress on the part of the
OSCE.
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In 2007, more attempts were made by the parties of the 5+2 talks to encourage
resumption. Four meetings between the mediators and the observers took place and one
informal meeting between all participants occurred once, in October, concentrating on
“finding ways to restart formal settlement negotiations, which have nonetheless failed to
resume.”168 There was relief of some tensions along the disputed border by cooperative
efforts between the OSCE and the JCC with the removal of a Moldovan police post and a
Transnistrian militia post.169 There was still no progress made regarding the reduction of
Russian armaments or withdrawal of Russian troops in the region. Because the 5+2
negotiations continued to remain stalled, the progress made by the OSCE during 2007
was minimal, but there are clearly demonstrated efforts by all parties except Transnistria
to continue the implementation of reforms.
2008 did not see a restart in official 5+2 negotiations, but did, however, see
meetings in a “3+2” capacity between Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, the EU and the United
States, where discussions were held regarding possible attempts at resuming the 5+2
format.170 Consultations in the 5+2 format were held, informally, in April, again in July,
and twice more in October and November, but no official resumption of talks could be
reached.171 Another informal 5+2 exchange took place late in the year in Vienna, and
“provided an opportunity to exchange views on the possibilities for expanding the scope
of the joint Moldovan and Transnistrian working groups on confidence-building measures
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and to discuss issues related to the free movement of people and goods between the banks
of the Nistru/Dniestr.”172 Both of these issues would be talked about between the
Moldovan President and the Transnistrian leader in a meeting in December. Though no
tangible progress was made, the willingness of the two parties to conduct a meeting in
which the Transnistria issues was discussed is viewed as positive progress.
During 2008, the OSCE was able to encourage non-conflict related cooperation
between the two sides, and “facilitated join Moldovan and Transnistrian working groups
that discussed cooperation in the fields of health, infrastructure development and the
environment.”173 Though this cooperation did not have a direct affect on the settlement
process, the willingness of the two sides to come together on these types of important
issues signaled positive progress. There remained no progress on the issue of withdrawals
of Russian equipment, weapons, or troops from the region in 2008.174
In 2009, following the two-years long stalemate of the 5+2 talks, and with the
OSCE under Greek presidency, Greek Ambassador Charalampos Christopoulos vowed to
renew the focus of the OSCE on the peaceful settlement of the Transnistiria conflict. On a
visit to Moldova in February, he reiterated this intent: “Together with the OSCE Mission
here on the ground, the Greek Chairmanship will work with both sides toward reaching a
genuine settlement. This settlement should be negotiated freely and peacefully; it should
confirm Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and also earn the support of the
Transdniestrians by guaranteeing them real autonomy that is properly respected, with real
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rights.”175 This declaration, however, did not equate to a settlement; in fact, the 5+2 talks
remained stalled, despite the best efforts of the OSCE. Informal meetings continued, but
were less than fruitful.
Despite no formal resumption of the 5+2 talks, some progress was made between
the two sides with the help of the OSCE, especially regarding the continuation of the joint
Moldovan and Transnistrian working groups established in 2008. The groups continued
their cooperation on issues of health, the development of infrastructure, and the
environment, and expanded the focus to include discussions to resume the normal
functioning of railway lines and improved economic and trade policies.176 Progress was
also made in conjunction with the JCC on improved freedom of movement of people,
goods and services,177 as well as improved “cooperation between the Moldovan and
Transdniestrian law-enforcement structures in the Bender area’ and increasing the
effectiveness of the military observers.”178 Again, there were no withdrawals of Russian
weapons, equipment, or troops as per the Istanbul Summit.
From 2006 to 2010, “informal” meetings of the 5+2 were the status quo, and five
took place in 2010 where freedom of movement was again discussed. Kanat Saudabauev,
the 2010 OSCE Chairperson, considered these talks to have produced “some positive
dynamics in the Transdniestrian settlement process.”179 However, progress was made, and
the result was regular meetings between the Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and his
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Transnistrian counterpart if effort “to resolve issues affecting the daily lives of people on
both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River.”180 One of these issues was solved with the
official re-opening of the passenger railway service running from Chisinau-TiraspolOdessa. This contributed to the simplification of railway transport regulations of goods
being exported by Transnistria as well.181 An extension of the 2006 agreement allowing
Moldovan farmers access to their Transnistrian-controlled land was also agreed upon
despite formal negotiations. These advances are all incredibly positive and would lead to
the resumption of official talks in 2011.
2011 presented quite positive progress, as the official 5+2 negotiations resumed
with full cooperation of all parties.182 The importance of this progress is noted in the 2011
report’s Message from the Secretary General, the Report of the Chairmanship-in-Office,
and the report from the Office of the Secretary General. The gains made toward bilateral
cooperation between the sides are expressed in positive notes throughout the report.
Ambassadors from 19 different permanent delegations to the OSCE participated in
discussions aimed at “fostering confidence-building measures between the sides and the
protection of human rights with the political leadership from both banks of Dniestr/Nistru
River”183 in order to progress the conflict settlement process.
The resumption of the 5+2 talks was the most notable progress from 2011, and it
lead to the strengthening of reform objectives from the informal negotiations of the past
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few years. Further progress was made concerning rail traffic through Transnistria, the
access to Transnistrian controlled land for Moldovan farmers was again extended, and the
restoration of telecommunication services was discussed.184 There was also a renewed
focus in confidence building on both sides by way of improved monitoring and increased
human rights education. This effort was complimented by the participation of
international organizations and a visit by 20 OSCE Ambassadors to a “three-day Human
Rights Summer School for young people and civil society.”185
If 2011 seemed promising, 2012 only served to bolster the positive feelings
toward the OSCE’s work in Moldova and Transnistria. A change in Transnistrian
leadership in 2011 was probably responsible for the change in attitude toward
Transnistrian participation in the 5+2 talks. A meeting between the Moldovan Prime
Minister, Vladimir Filat and the Transnistrian leader, Yevgeny Shevchuk in RottachEgern, Germany seemed to send “a clear message that negotiators should continue in
their work on finding a special status for Transdniestria based on the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.”186
The long-discussed agreements regarding the re-opening of freight rail traffic
through Transnistria were signed, opening up more trade possibilities for both
Transnistria and Moldova.187 Human rights efforts continued on both banks of the River,
and the OSCE Mission to Moldova began working closely with the OSCE Office of the
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Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, extending their work
into Transnistria as well as part of increased confidence-building efforts.188 Overall, the
progress in 2012 is largely positive.
2013, the twentieth anniversary of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, presented new
challenges for the OSCE and for the region near and including the post-Soviet space. In
the Message from the General Secretary in the 2013 report, Lamberto Zannier, OSCE
Secretary General, notes, “The re-emergence of mistrust and divisions threatens to
undermine security in our region, as does instability in neighboring regions.”189 The
Transnistria conflict was featured in the 2013 report as an example of the OSCE’s efforts
toward “facilitating resolution of the protracted conflicts” in the region, a “top priority for
the Chairmanship.”190 Ironically, Ukraine was the 2013 OSCE Chair, and made a
profound statement regarding the conflicts the OSCE aimed to stabilize or resolve:

!

We are convinced that the so-called protracted conflicts continue to represent a
serious threat to our regional stability. Helping the parties to find a political
solution should remain the highest priority for the OSCE, the Chairmanship and
for all participating States. Tested and proven instruments the OSCE has in stock,
such as dialogue facilitation, mediation, preventative diplomacy and non-military
confidence-building measures, as well as capacity- and peace-building activities,
must be used in conjunction with meeting the immediate needs of people in
conflict-affected territories. This would help create an atmosphere of truss and
confidence between people. communities and nations, and pave the way for
sustainable resolution of conflicts.191

The Chairmanship encouraged continued participation on all sides in continued 5+2 talks
toward reaching a sustainable resolution to the Transnistria conflict. The year was,
188
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unfortunately, not without incident. Tensions rose in the Security Zone, and a number of
violent incidents occurred, which required the Chair’s engagement to diffuse.192
Five rounds of 5+2 negotiations were held in 2013 and the OSCE counted the
progress made in these negotiations as positive. Similar efforts toward confidencebuilding and improved human rights conditions continued through 2013, including the
successful Human Rights Summer School. Overall, no significant changes toward a
resolution of the conflict were made, but relations between Moldova and Transnistria
seem to be improving and cooperation is at least happening in many important areas.
The following figures illustrate the frequency of official (O) and unofficial (U)
meetings between parties involve in the 5+2 negotiations (Fig. 3), as well as the staff and
budget allocated to the OSCE efforts in Moldova (Fig. 4).
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Figure. 3: Meetings Between 5+2Participants. Source: OSCE Progress Reports 2007-2013.
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In Fig. 3, where there are two numbers listed in a format x+y, multiple meetings

are represented. For example, in 2009, there are 3 unofficial meetings between the 5+2,
and 1 unofficial meeting between Moldova and Transnistria. When X is noted (in 2010)
the number of meetings was kept confidential by the parties.

!
YEAR
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Figure 4: OSCE Mission to Moldova Budget and Staff. Source: OSCE Progress Reports 2006-2013.
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The most important focus of the OSCE with regard to the Transnistria issue is the

role it plays in the 5+2 negotiations. These are, perhaps, one of the most vital aspects of
the process of conflict resolution, and, though the progress seems limited, there were
significant gains made through unofficial talks when the level of tension is considered.
The activities of the JCC seem to have leveled off at a good place, as they were not
mentioned in the 2012 or 2013 report, resulting in a designation of “Little to no progress”
in the chart above. This designation is not necessarily negative, especially when the
efforts are aimed at stabilization and control. Once a certain level of stabilization and
control is reached, maintenance is key. The OSCE was able to make incremental progress
in three of the four areas. Again, zero progress has been made toward the criteria agreed
upon in the Istanbul Summit.
Progress of EUBAM

!

The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

launched in 2006, less than one year following the joint request made for such a mission
by the leaders of Moldova and Ukraine. Within six months, “60 EU experts and around
40 local staff”193 had been assigned to work in the region, and a budget of four million
Euro had been allocated through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism of the EU budget.194
When second eighteen-month phase was launched the same year, the budget was
increased by sixteen million Euro, bringing the total budget to twenty million. The staff
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was also increased to over 100 experts.195 The OSCE also works closely with EUBAM to
encourage peaceful cooperation in the region, serving on the EUBAM Advisory Board
and attending the monthly coordination meetings held between Moldova, Ukraine, and
EUBAM.196
I have chosen to focus on the following goals of EUBAM in evaluating the
progress of efforts in Moldova: (Listed in no particular order. Some related goals have
been combined by the author in the interest of brevity.)
1. Enhance professional capacities and decrease corruption of customs agents and
border guards
2. Improve knowledge of EU border control standards
3. Improved cross-border cooperation between Moldovan and Ukrainian services.
4. Facilitating improved trade relations and increasing legitimate trade
5. Full demarcation of border
2006 was the Mission’s first year, and much of the focus was on on-the-job
training for the border control guards and customs officials on both sides in order to
ensure European standards were being practiced. This would ensure the strengthening of
the legitimacy of the border, even in the Transnistria section, and aimed to control some
of the black market existing there, which often provided financial support to the
separatists. Institutional capacity building was another focus of 2006, and resulted in a
complete reorganization of the Moldovan Customs Service, “aiming at introducing an
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organizational structure capable of driving the progress towards European Best
Practices.”197
The “Green Border,” which is the border between Moldova and Ukraine not
including the Transnistria section, required full demarcation, which became a central
focus of the Mission in 2006 and would continue in subsequent years. Management of the
Transnistria border was also o top-of-mind focus. During 2006, however, “with the
support of EUBAM, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (UASBGS) have made
great strides in improving their management of the ‘TN’198 segment of the MoldovaUkraine border.”199 This is viewed as very positive progress, as the ‘TN’ segment of the
border was the most highly trafficked area experiencing criminal smuggling activities.200
The full demarcation of the border and improved cross-border cooperation between
Moldova and Ukraine would continue to cut down on illegal activities and provide a
climate for negotiations for improved relations between Moldova and Transnistria.
2007 was a strong year for EUBAM, which was able to address many structural
issues concerning border controls, as well as encourage greater cooperation between the
sides and increased transparency of border activities.201 Thanks to the cooperation
between EUBAM and the OSCE regarding communication and negotiations between
Moldova and Transnistria, 380 Transnistrian companies had registered with Moldovan
authorities, and were experiencing greater ease of exporting of goods to Moldova across
197

Ibid.
Transnistria.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 EUBAM Annual Report: 2007. June 18, 2008. http://www.eubam.org/en/knowledge/eubam_pubs/
ar_2007 Date Accessed: 12.9.14.
198

!71

the controlled border.202 Customs processes had been improved and controls
strengthened.203
The Mission was extended in 2007 to 2009, signifying confidence on the part of
the EU that the EUBAM was accomplishing its goals. “Organised criminal activity,
including smuggling of goods and people, especially across the Transnistiran segment of
the border, and the persistent challenge of corruption are still present,”204 all of which
represented the work still to be done. But the Mission through 2007 had succeeded in
increasing oversight at border crossings and reducing the instance of smuggling
undocumented and unregulated goods such as cigarettes.205 Capacity building, risk
analysis capacity, integrated border management, anti-corruption efforts, and confidence
building between the two sides would continue to be at the center of the Mission’s
objectives.206
Improved relations between Moldova and Transnistrian companies wanting to
conduct business with Moldova were a major focus in 2008. EUBAM was clearly
encouraging this, “by the end of 2008, 498 companies from the Transnistria region of
Moldova had registered with the State Register Chamber of Moldova in order to enjoy
these [trade] preferences.”207 There were also efforts made to make transportation across
the border easier, and negotiations began which were focused on “the resumption of
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railway traffic through the ‘TN’ region of the Republic of Moldova…Reflecting the
customs implications, EUBAM was requested to be present at the consultations.”208
These advances signal not only a greater degree of cooperation between the two sides,
but an acknowledgment by the Transnistria side that trade with Moldova is beneficial.
2008 was overall a positive year, and this did not go unnoticed by the EU. “Both
Moldova and Ukraine showed increasing commitment towards European integration,
including closer cooperation with EU law enforcement agencies. The EU enlargement
experience indicates that this process requires legal and technical harmonization of
border management, as well as confidence building with European partners through
closer international cooperation.”209 The efforts of the OSCE and of EUBAM were
moving Moldova closer to achieving the goals set forth in the ENP Action Plan, though
more progress would be needed in order to reach a resolution to the Transnistria issue.
In 2009, Moldova and Ukraine requested an extension of the EUBAM for another
two years, through November, 2011.210 This request was granted, due mostly to the
positive progress made in the first three years by EUBAM, but also because there was
still much work to be done. Moldova and Transnistira had reached a new level of
cooperation through the efforts of EUBAM, and the increased trade allowed from these
positive advances was beneficial to both sides. 2009 saw the number of registered
companies from the ‘TN’ sector rise to 596.211 The border had become more secure and
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was seeing less illicit activity than in years past. Relations between Moldova and Ukraine
were also significantly stronger than they had ever been.212
Border demarcation had continued successfully along the Moldovan-Ukrainian
border, and new efforts to demilitarize and professionalize areas of the border had
become an additional focus of EUBAM.213 Corruption continued to be a problem on both
sides of the border and lead to new anti-corruption training sessions and increased
undercover agent training in order to combat the issue.214 Increased border management
lead to a decrease in illegal meat smuggling across the Transnistrian border sector.215
The progress of EUBAM thus far was viewed as increasingly positive by the EU,
and, in 2010, a EUROPOL216 mobile office was set up at the EUABM Operational Centre
to assist in combating criminal activity and smuggling along the border.217 The
EUROPOL center was to be operated by EUBAM, and was the first one to be set up by
the EU outside of EU territory.218 There were also evaluations made at two Moldovan
Border Crossing Points (BCP) based on the Shengen evaluation model, whose standards
meet the EU acquis. “The idea idea of the request [made by the Director General of the
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Border Guard Service of the Republic of Moldova] was to conduct a pre-evaluation of
two international BCPs as a preparatory step for subsequent evaluation visits by EC
(European Commission) experts in the context of ongoing dialogue on the visa
liberalization regime between the Republic of Moldova and the EU.”219 The results were
promising: Moldova had already implemented some of the necessary controls to meet EU
requirements and was well on its way to continue the trend.
Trade relations across the border continued to improve over 2010 and by the end
of the year 681 ‘TN’ businesses were registered in Chisinau. This was beneficial to the
Transnistrian economy, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis, as 2010
showed “a steady growth in trade volume.”220 Another success story coming out of
EUBAM in 2010 was the resumption of passenger rail between Chisinau to Odessa,
running through Transnistria. The train began running on October 1 and, in Transnistria,
border police and customs agents perform checks of the cars and passengers. No major
issues had occurred since the resumption of the rail system.221
Border demarcation continued, and 120 km of the border was “preliminarily
marked.”222 This effort would continue and would help further strengthen controls and
border regulations. Public outreach and confidence-building measures also continued in
2010, with EUBAM field offices participating in local festivals and organizing
approximately 10 shows where representatives traveled throughout the region spreading
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information about the mission and answering any questions the public may have had.223
In 2011 another extension of the Mission was granted, this time for four more
years, again indicating the progress made by the Mission since its inception. In the
Forward by the Head of the Mission in 2011, Udo Burkholder, he states, “I believe that
this fact reflects the good reputation of the Mission in the two host countries, and the
professional and productive cooperation with the Mission’s partners.”224 More progress
was made regarding the Mission’s contribution to attempted settlement of the Transnistria
conflict in the way of confidence-building and further discussion of increased railway
operations. Border demarcation also continued, as this is one of the most important
factors of securing the border: first it has to be clearly marked and agreed upon.
EUBAM continues to improve on border-crossing and customs training and
operations in order to extend the professional capacity of all agents working the border.225
This has been an ongoing effort and has lead to faster and easier border crossing
experiences for both people and commercial entities trying to cross the border. Continued
improvements will, of course, contribute to confidence in society, further legitimizing the
Mission’s work in the area.
In addition to the ongoing initiatives addressed by EUBAM, 2011 also saw the
first discussions of a new goal, which would further advance Moldova towards EU
standards: an Integrated Border Managament (IBM) system. “In both countries [Moldova
and Ukraine] the implementation of IBM is an integrated part of their visa dialogue with
223
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the European Union.”226 EUBAM is an important part of this effort, as they will assist in
the implementation of all IBM systems when the time comes.
2012 saw continued efforts in the way of strengthened border controls, improved
training and operations by police and agents at border crossings and customs checkpoints,
and increased cross-border cooperation. Border demarcation also continued, and over 430
km of the Transnistiran segment was demarcated or, at the very least, preliminarily
marked for demarcation by the end of 2012.227 There were also increases, again, in the
number of Transnistiran businesses registered in Chisinau, bringing the total to 769
companies.228 Negotiations to resume freight-rail made progress as well, likely bolstered
by the success of the resumption of passenger rail across the Transnistria region. The
implementation of IBM stipulated tasks also continued in an effort to reach
compliance.229
The progress made in 2013 was quite similar to that in previous years. Border
demarcation efforts are close to being concluded; at the end of 2013, just over 15 km of
the Transnistrian sector was left to be demarcated.230 Cooperation between Moldova and
Transnistrian businesses continued to occur, and, “as of 13 December, 2013, nearly one
thousand businesses from the left bank [Transnistria] are able to benefit”231 from formal
registration with Chisinau. This access to the European market had resulted in an increase
226
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in trade with the EU and a decrease in trade with Russia. In 2013, “almost half of the
exports were to the EU, while only one third of the goods were exported to Russia.”232
The EUBAM has always worked closely with the OSCE and, in 2013, was invited
to provide technical support in the 5+2 talks. “Upon request of the OSCE Special
Representative on the Transnistrian conflict, EUBAM delivered a presentation on the
Mission activities, including support to confidence building initiatives in the areas of
customs and transport.”233 At this meeting, issues of foreign trade were discussed within
the context of a future Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with
the EU234, which would come with the Association Agreement that would be signed in
2014.
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EUBAM is committed to stabilizing the border between Moldova and Ukraine
and to reaching a peaceful settlement of the Transnistria conflict. Confidence building,
improved and increased trade relations and opportunities between the two entities, and
increasing the capacity for travel and the movement of goods across the border are all
central to this effort. Much of the progress made in these areas has been due to the efforts
of EUBAM and the successes of these efforts in facilitating a more functional
relationship between the leaders of Moldova and Transnistria.
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The ENP: Was it Enough?
!

Chapter Five: Conclusion

The EU has been aware of the European ambitions existing in many of the post-

Soviet states, including Moldova, for quite some time. As the EU enlarges eastward its
borders have the potential to become much less stable. The accession of Romania in 2007
resulted in a shared border with a state experiencing an internal secessionist conflict.
Though the conflict was “frozen” and did not present many legitimate threats of violence
directly to the EU, it was unsettling. With the ENP and the Action Plans created out of it,
an attempt was made to improve conditions, encourage prosperity, and contribute to
stability. The efforts on the parts of the states participating in the ENP and the Action
Plans were real, but the challenges were difficult to overcome. Heavy Russian influence,
weak economies, minority resistance to European integration, and the existence of
several de facto states, like Transnistria, would need much more than broadly articulated
benchmarks with little specificity or widely active EU support.
Where the ENP falls short is with the specific steps to be taken to achieve the
goals set forth. The goals are there, and they are admirable, but how is the poorest state in
Europe, Moldova, supposed to rise to European standards with limited help from the EU?
The EU did contribute some funding to support some of the initiatives, and, of course,
funded the EUBAM Mission, and several other international organizations were able to
contribute funds as well, but funding alone is not enough. There need to be clear,
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demonstrable, and attainable goals, set in small, manageable increments as well as
consequences for Transnistria if advances in the peaceful settlement of the conflict are
not made in order for Moldova to experience the greatest degree of success via the ENP
and its Action Plan.
I view the Action Plan as a good general road map, but not as a truly effective
method of demonstrating advances toward European standards or towards settling the
Transnistria conflict. There are no measurable benchmarks where achievement can be
clearly demonstrated. There are only vague parameters where “good” or “little” progress
can be seen, but even the definition of “good” progress is not defined in the Plan. I see
little value to the Action Plan and its progress reports with regard to the advancement of
Moldova’s European ambitions or towards resolving the conflict with Transnistria. There
are few articulated incentives. Increased access to the European market given the degree
of progress attained, increased political inclusion, even in a minor capacity, could both
help advance Moldova’s European progress. The issue of incentive is especially a
problem when it is considered that, regardless of the amount of progress made by
Moldova over the course of the Action Plan, there is no promise of European Union
membership waiting at the end.
OSCE and EUBAM: Is Action on the Ground More Effective than Lofty Goals?

!

The most demonstrable and effective progress was made by the OSCE and by
EUBAM. The OSCE facilitated what was perhaps the most productive activity between
Moldova and Transnistria: the 5+2 talks. Despite being “stalled” from 2006-2010, the
talks were able to yield enhanced degrees of cooperation between the two parties once
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they resumed. Even during the “stalled” years, the informal talks resulted in some
positive progress and increased cooperation between the two sides. While there are still
clearly areas of dispute, the relations between the two sides can continue to improve if the
5+2 talks can continue to occur.
EUBAM had some of the greatest successes, and was able to improve controls
along the newly (mostly) demarcated border. This allowed for greater movement, and
regulation of the movement, of goods between Moldova and Transnistria - an economic
benefit for both sides. There was also the important resumption of passenger rail across
the disputed border, and the possibility of freight rail resumption in the near future. The
active confidence-building initiatives, which involved the citizens on all sides: Moldova,
Transnistria, and Ukraine, continue to improve relations between the actors, and
encourage the implementation of other initiatives, such as improved security at border
crossings and improved professional capacities of customs agents. EUBAM’s successes
were demonstrable, and continue to improve conditions at the border.
The work of both the OSCE and of EUBAM set out to make effective changes
over time, and year-over-year the focus mostly remained the same. As long as there were
continued degrees of improvement in the same areas, the progress over time would be
significant. This is the reason for much of the repetitiveness of the progress reports and
the subsequent evaluation thereof. No single large and immediate initiatives were
undertaken because the goal was long-lasting progress rather than immediate, fragile
results.

!
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Crimea: A New Conflict Fast-Forwards Association Agreements

!

Many scholars and analysts have accused the EU of using initiatives such as the

ENP and ENP Action Plans as “dangling carrots” over the heads of the states on its
periphery, encouraging the implementation of liberal ideals and democratic institutions as
a demonstration of a commitment to European standards based on an empty promise of
possible EU integration in the future. This certainly seemed to be the case with Moldova
until recently, when the eruption of a hot conflict between Ukraine and Crimea garnered
international attention, and the support of the Crimean secessionist movement by Russia.
While the conflict in Ukraine is considered an ethnic one, and the conflict in
Transnistria is largely political, though it masquerades as somewhat ethnically-based,
there are many similarities between the two, especially the two largest points of
contention between the majority and the secessionist minority: European integration and
Russian influence. The Ukrainian conflict, which occurred in a region that has been
wrought with tension for some time, was triggered by the offer of an Association
Agreement by the EU to Ukraine.
In late 2013, when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, in a demonstration of
intent to strengthen ties with Russia, abandoned a commitment to sign an Association
Agreement with the European Union, a move which precedes membership, peaceful
protests began in the capital city of Kiev.235 In January of 2014, the clashes between
protesters and the Ukrainian government turned violent, and the secessionist movement
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of Crimea began to gain ground.236 By the end of February, Yanukovych had fled and
pro-Russian fighters began seizing control of administrative buildings in Crimea.237 In
March, Crimea held a secession referendum, opting to join with Russia, and Russian
President Vladmir Putin signed a bill to “absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation.”238
The conflict continued, spreading eastward into the city of Donetsk, and has yet to be
resolved.239
This presented an unsettling situation for the EU, and would need to be addressed
quickly. Western countries throughout Europe and including the United States began
imposing sanctions on Russia in the wake of Russia’s interference and support in Crimea.
Fighting continued, but on June 27, 2014, the EU signed Association Agreements, often
seen as the next step to accession into the EU, and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreements with the governments of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.240 These
Agreements are designed to further integrate the countries signing them into the EU via
continued implementation of liberal ideals and democratic institutions and more
beneficial economic opportunities. Keeping up the necessary reforms will not be easy for
the three countries, each facing many internal issues, and each dealing with a separatist
conflict within its territory.
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The conflict in Ukraine raises concerns regarding Moldova’s territorial integrity.
Minority dissenters in Gagauzia and Transnistria may look at the secession and
subsequent annexation of Crimea as a hopeful possibility of successful secession from
Moldova. Transnistria reacted very positively when Russia annexed Crimea: “the
Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic is very encouraged by a decree of the President of the
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ‘On the recognition of the Republic of Crimea’…The
return of Crimea to Russia is a highly just decision based on the consolidated position of
the people of Crimea and of all Russians.”241 The official statement went on to note a
similar election in Transnistria in 2006 which yielded nearly the exact same results as the
referendum held on Crimea, when “more than 97 per cent of voters supported
independence, to be followed by Transnistria’s free accession to Russia; more than 78 per
cent of voters took part in the voting.”242 While this election and its results were not
recognized by anyone outside of Transnistria, including Russia, there may likely be
another similar situation emerging soon enough. The presence of fighting and Russian
troops in neighboring Ukraine prompted NATO, United States, and EU officials to
“repeatedly warn(ed) of Russia’s threat to Moldova’s territorial integrity.”243
Since the onset of the Crimean conflict, Moldova has seen some political backand-forth between pro-European parties and pro-Russian parties in the most recent
election, the results of which were, for some time, undecided. In early 2014, proEuropean parties were able to emerge with a narrow majority in parliament, however, the
241
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strongest party in parliament would be the Socialist Party (PSRM), who had developed
close ties with Russia.244 The third-largest group would be the Communist Party, who had
been successful in the past of adopting some policies seen by Moldovans as favoring
Russia.245 The count as of January 12, 2014 was the probable pro-European alliance 56
seats and the Socialist and Communist parties a combined 45 seats out of the 101member parliament.246 This was no guarantee of a pro-European majority coalition, as the
same parties were unable to remain united in 2013, when the aforementioned collapse of
the government resulted from the crumbling of the pro-European coalition, the Alliance
for European Integration. By the end of November in 2014, the “pro-European parties
failed to agree on key government positions,”247 including on a prime minister. In early
2015, the coalition became even more shaky when differences between two of the three
coalition parties emerged.248 This still did not give the Socialists and the Communists
enough votes to hold a majority and form a government, but it did give pause to some
pro-European members. However, in a positive move for the pro-Europeans, the fragile
parliament approved a new prime minister, described as pro-EU, businessman Chiril
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Gaburici, who stated that “forging ever closer ties with Europe would be a top priority for
his government.”249
A pro-EU government will not be able to solve the Transnistria conflict or create
stability alone. Greater active assistance from the EU will be necessary for the success of
these Agreements, to further advance these fledgling democracies toward full European
standards, to build prosperous economies, and to stabilize the separatist conflicts and
solve the problem of the existing de facto states, this much is obvious. I would suggest
greater political support of pro-EU candidates by the EU. When looking at the case study
of Moldova and the efficacy of the EU’s efforts to help resolve the Transnistria issue as a
road map for how to handle Crimea, or even South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia
today, it is evident that more direct interaction and involvement from the EU must
accompany the Association Agreements if they are to be effective.
EUBAM and the OSCE, both actively at work on the ground in Moldova, focused
on implementing policy and structures for improved functionality, building confidence
within civil society, and raising the standards by which government agents are held to
through training. These proved to be some of the most positive results producing efforts
over the decade since the ENP Action Plan was signed. The OSCE is active in Ukraine
and in Georgia as well, and, in cooperation with EUBAM was able to strengthen the
border, improve security, and encourage greater communication between the sides in the
Transnistria region.
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On March 3, 2015, the European Commission launched a commission on the
future of the ENP. The joint consultation paper “Towards a new European Neighborhood
Policy” suggests that perhaps it is time to reevaluate the approaches taken in the
Neighborhood in the past. Given the recent and seemingly widespread shift in interest
increased association with Russia in several of the neighborhood states, the Commission
suggests that the ENP should be revised to “consider the reasons for this and examine
ways to fit better the aspirations on both sides…It should also be considered how the EU
should best respond to crises and conflict situations, including the protracted ones, taking
into account the sources of influence and pressure on out partners that determine their
political positions, including towards the EU.”250 Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated in
a discussion announcing the future of the ENP that

!

The new ENP must respect the views and experience of our partners; it must not
be condescending, patronizing or even preaching. We must ensure that we
develop a real partnership of equals on the basis of shared interests, while always
promoting universal principles…Recent developments in the region have
increased the challenges we all face: from economic pressures to irregular
migration and security threats. We need a strong policy to be able to tackle these
issues. We also need to understand better the different aspirations, values and
interests of our partners. This is what the review is about if we are to have a
robust political relationship between our neighbours and us.251

These efforts should be continued in Moldova, and should be implemented in Ukraine
and Georgia to put these countries in the best positions to meet the rigorous requirements
of the new Association Agreements. Greater active EU involvement in the Neighborhood
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will benefit the efforts to liberalize and stabilize the region, especially with regard to
conflict resolution. In a report released in early 2015 by Bertelsmann Stiftung, this
suggestion is supported:

!

The EU, together with its Delegations, can play a vital role in organizing postconflict platforms to ensure inclusive transition processes. It can strengthen its
role in mobilizing and/or supporting other international efforts for peace and postconflict reconstruction. Finally, the EU should not shy away from more direct
interventions and mediation in emerging conflicts where the circumstances favour
such options. After all, the EU played a crucial role in the 2004 Orange
Revolution, in the 2008 war in Georgia, in the 2013 Serbia-Kosovo Agreement.
These need not be isolated cases.252
Perhaps with a new approach to the Neighborhood which incorporates greater EU

involvement in assisting the states in transition, as well as the consideration of the
concerns of those not in favor of further European integration, in time, stability may be
achieved and a resolution to several conflicts reached.
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